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THE RIGHTS OF MARRIAGE:
OBERGEFELL, DIN, AND THE FUTURE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL FAMILY LAW
Kerry Abramst
In the summer of 2015 the United States Supreme Court
handed down two groundbreaking constitutional family law
decisions. One decision became famous overnight Obergefell
v. Hodges declared that same-sex couples have the constitu-
tional right to marry. The other, Kerry v. Din, went largely
overlooked. That later case concerned not the right to marry
but the rights of marriage. In particular, it asked whether a
person has a constitutional liberty interest in living with his or
her spouse. This case is suddenly of paramount importance:
executive orders targeting particular groups of immigrants im-
plicate directly this right to family reunification.
This Article argues that neither Obergefell nor Din can be
understood fully without the other. The constitutional issues
in the cases-the right to marry and the rights of marriage-
stem from the same text and doctrines, implicate the same
relationships, and reflect cultural understandings of the
meaning of marriage and family. Read together, the two
cases suggest that the rights of unmarried couples and
LGBTQ people will be expanded-but only somewhat-by
Obergefell and that the right to family reunification qualifes
as a "right of marriage" under the Constitution.
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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2015, the United States Supreme Court
handed down two groundbreaking constitutional family law de-
cisions. In one, Obergefell v. Hodges, a majority of the Su-
preme Court declared that same-sex couples have the
constitutional right to marry.1 Those who celebrated the deci-
sion, as well as those who derided it, recognized it as a major
event in the history of constitutional law. Newspapers and me-
dia outlets around the world covered it, advocates on both
sides of the issue rallied outside the Supreme Court, and legal
scholars produced thousands of pages of commentary. 2
Just eleven days before the Supreme Court handed down
Obergefell, however, it issued an opinion in Kerry v. Din.3 Un-
like Obergefell, this decision went largely unnoticed by the
press, courts, lawyers, and the public. Din concerned not the
right to marry but the rights ofmarriage. In particular, it asked
whether a person has a constitutional liberty interest in living
with his or her spouse. In Din, a United States citizen claimed
that the federal government's arbitrary denial of a visa to her
husband violated procedural due process.4 Although Din lost
her case-Justice Anthony Kennedy's concurrence held that
she had been given a good enough reason for her husband's
1 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, 'Equal Dignity', N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2015, at Al
(reporting on the Obergefell ruling and the Justices' varying viewpoints on the
decision).
3 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (plurality opinion).
4 Id. at 2133.
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exclusion-six of the Justices assumed for purposes of the case
that a U.S. citizen does have a due process liberty interest in
his or her marriage to a noncitizen.5 Put differently, the right to
marry means little if individuals cannot enjoy the benefits of
marriage.
When the Supreme Court issued the Din decision, few no-
ticed. Its brief mentions in the press were soon eclipsed by the
decision in Obergefell a few days later. Now, however, Din is
having a rebirth. President Donald J. Trump has issued execu-
tive orders suspending immigration from certain countries and
broadening deportations.6 Although these orders continue to
be rescinded and supplanted with new versions, they share a
common characteristic-they directly implicate the marriage
rights at issue in Dir. The family reunification claims articu-
lated in Din are relatively uncharted waters for constitutional
family law, and ones that many people, citizens and nonci-
tizens alike, are mobilizing in suits challenging President
Trump's orders.7 In time, Din may emerge as a constitutional
precedent equal to Obergefell in historical and legal
importance.
So far, however, Obergefel has been the decision that liti-
gants, lawyers, legislators, and judges have turned to in adju-
dicating family constitutional cases. Scholars, too, have
focused on Obergefell since the Court issued its Obergefell
decision, over one thousand law review articles and notes have
discussed the case." Given this enormous volume, it is difficult
to do justice to the range of responses, but much of the schol-
arship falls roughly into two camps-scholars who see in
Obergefell hope for the expansion of constitutional family rights
and LGBTQ rights more broadly9 and those who see
5 Id. at 2139 (Alto, J., concurring) (holding that Din's husband's visa denial
satisfied due process).
6 See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Exec.
Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017); Proclamation 9645, 82 Fed.
Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017).
7 See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of Law Professors of Constitutional Law,
Federal Court Jurisdiction, Immigration, National Security, and Citizenship in
Support of Petitioners at 12, Darweesh v. Trump, Case 1- 17-cv-00480-CBA
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2017) (discussing Kerry v. Din).
8 As of this writing, 1415 articles available on Westlaw cite to Obergefell.
9 See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260,
2357-59 (2017) (arguing that Obergefell will lead to the expansion of parental
rights for gays and lesbians); Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L.
REv. 151, 158 (2016) (arguing that Obergefell "might give the Court cause to
reconsider precedents that harshly confined the promise of equal protection in the
race, sex, class, and disability contexts"); Gregg Strauss, The Positive Right to
Marry, 102 VA. L. REv. 1691, 1739-41 (2016) (arguing that the government has an
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Obergefell's valorization of marriage as potentially harmful for
unmarried or otherwise nonconforming people or groups.1 0
The attribute shared by most of these readings, however, is
that the Obergefell opinion is the definitive statement of consti-
tutional marriage rights. Reading Obergefell with Din under-
cuts this assumption.
In contrast, so far, Din has been cited primarily in the
litigation concerning President Trump's recent executive orders
suspending immigration from several predominantly Muslim
countries." Courts and lawyers understand Din as an opinion
about the role of the "plenary power doctrine" in immigration
cases, and that doctrine's relationship to procedural due pro-
cess-and so it is.1 2 It is also, however, an opinion about mar-
riage rights, and those rights must be understood within the
context of the expansion and constitutionalization of family
rights in the last fifty years.' 3 Reading Din with Obergefell
reveals this broader meaning.
affirmative obligation to provide recognition of adult intimate relationships as
supported in Obergefell); Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name,
129 HARv. L. REv. FoRUM 16, 17 (2015) (arguing that the concept of "equal dignity"
in Justice Kennedy's opinion "lays the groundwork for an ongoing constitutional
dialogue about fundamental rights and the meaning of equality"); Kenji Yoshino,
A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REv. 147, 148 (2015)
(arguing that Obergefell is a "game changer for substantive due process").
10 See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage and the Marital Presump-
tion Post-Obergefell, 84 UMKC L. REv. 663, 670-73 (predicting that parenthood
will continue to be a battleground for the recognition of families established by
same-sex parents); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Marriage Equality, Workplace
Inequality: The Next Gay Rights Battle, 67 FLA. L. REv. 1099, 1112-17 (2015)
(arguing that Obergefell's emphasis on conformity will make it difficult to extend
to other areas of discrimination law); Clare Huntington, Obergefell's Conserva-
tism: Reffying Familial Fronts, 84 FORDHAM. L. REv. 23, 29-30 (2015) (arguing that
Obergefell undervalues nonmarital families); Melissa Murray, Obergefell v.
Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CALiF. L. REv. 1207, 1212-16 (2016)
(predicting that Obergefell will justify discrimination against nonmarital families).
11 See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1166 (9th Cir. 2017) (per
curiam) (noting that, even if green card holders were not covered by the executive
order, "applicants who have a relationship with a U.S. resident" might have claims
to assert and citing to Justice Kennedy's concurrence and Justice Breyer's dissent
in Kerry v. Din); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Immigration, Family, and Constitu-
tional Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 10-11, Trump v. Int'l Refugee
Assistance Project, 2017 WL 4518553 (Sept. 18, 2017) (No. 16-1436), http://
www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/16_1436_16_1540_bsac_
Inmmigration-Family-andConstitutionalLawProfessors.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RJ7U-T6DC].
12 See Kerry Abrams, Family Reunifcatfon and the Security State, 32 CONST.
CoMMENT. 247, 277-79 (2017) (analyzing the plenary power doctrine and its rela-
tion to Din).
13 See generally David D. Meyer, The Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42
FAM. L.Q. 529, 531-51 (2008) (describing evolution of constitutional family
rights).
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This Article argues that neither Obergefell nor Din can be
understood fully without the other. The constitutional issues
in the cases-the right to marry and the rights of marriage-
stem from the same text and doctrines, implicate the same
relationships, and reflect cultural understandings of the mean-
ing of marriage and family. The Justices were presumably cir-
culating drafts of both opinions during the spring of 2015, and,
indeed, traces of the rhetoric and reasoning in each case ap-
pear in the other.
Two aspects of Obergefell and Din are foregrounded
through this synthesized reading. First, Justice Kennedy's
Obergefell opinion reads differently alongside Din and comes off
as simultaneously broader in application and narrower in
scope. Reading his Obergefell majority alongside his Din con-
currence calls into question the scope of the family rights he
would consider protected as a constitutional liberty interest.
Reading Kennedy's Obergefell majority alone could lead a
reader to assume-wrongly-that his views of marriage rights
are expansive; reading Din alone could lead a reader to believe
-again, wrongly-that they are stingy. Read together, Justice
Kennedy's decisions in Obergefell and Din reveal an under-
standing of marriage as a form of self-expression and an exer-
cise of responsible citizenship, an institution that the
government has an interest in fostering because of the service
it does for society. Given that Justice Kennedy remains, at
least for now, the Court's "swing vote" and is likely to play an
important role in constitutional litigation in cases involving
everything from family reunification to family-based citizenship
to religious exemptions to LGBTQ-protective laws, understand-
ing the scope of his theory is critical for litigants, scholars, and
courts alike.
Second, reading Din and Obergefetl together better eluci-
dates the positions of the other Justices who wrote in those
cases, enabling a better understanding of how they will ap-
proach future constitutional family claims. Justice Stephen
Breyer's Din dissent, for example, is markedly dissimilar from
the majority opinion he joined in Obergefet, in ways that sug-
gest a very different constitutional status for marriage that is
simultaneously broader than the right protected in Obergefell
and yet less historically embedded. Similarly, Justices Scalia,
Thomas, Alito, and Roberts each wrote dissents in Obergefetl
but divided in their reasoning for denying the family reunifica-
tion claim at issue in Dir. In that case, Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Roberts resisted any recognition of a due process
2018] 505
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interest in family reunification, but Justice Alito joined Justice
Kennedy's concurrence, which assumed that such a right exis-
ted. Read together, these two cases identify different fault lines
between the Justices than those that are visible in either case
alone.
At first glance, this Article may appear to be making a
pedestrian, even obvious, point-that cases must be read to-
gether, and no single Supreme Court case adequately describes
the law. Obergefell, however, has been read by most scholars
in light of Justice Kennedy's other LGBTQ rights opinions, in-
cluding Romer v. Evans, Lawrence v. Texas, and United States
v. Windsor, but not in light of Din.14 In fact, most family law
and constitutional law scholars have completely ignored Din,15
or treated it as a specialized immigration case. 16 The argument
14 517 U.S. 620 (1996); 539 U.S. 558 (2003); 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
15 As of this writing, of the 1,415 articles written so far on Obergefell pub-
lished on Westlaw, 31 cite to Din. For examples of those that do cite to Din, see
Erin B. Corcoran, #Love Wins* *But Only if You Marry One of Us, 2015 UTAH L.
REv. ONLAW 77, 84-88 (2015) (arguing that the Court is less protective of nonci-
tizens' marriages than citizens' marriages); Kari E. Hong, Obergefell's Sword* The
Liberal State Interest in Marriage, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1417, 1440-41
(arguing that Obergefells recognition of a new state interest in the dignity of
marriage "paves the way for state intervention as a welcomed and needed benefit
of marriage" and using Din as an example); Irina D. Manta & Cassandra Burke
Robertson, Secret Jurisdiction, 65 EMORY L.J. 1313, 1344-46 (2016) (suggesting
that Din indicates that a constitutional challenge to the "no-fly list" would be
difficult); Ann Woolhandler, Procedural Due Process Liberty Interests, 43 HASTINGS
CONST. L. Q. 811, 855-59 (2016) (using Din to develop a taxonomy of procedural
due process categories); Mary Ziegler, The Conservative Magna Carta., 94 N.C. L.
REv. 1653, 1664, 1670-71 (2016) (arguing that the conservative Justices use
Magna Carta as an alternative to the progressive vision offered by the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments and using Justice Scalia's Din plurality opinion as an example).
16 See, e.g., Jill E. Family, The Executive Power of Process in Immigration Law,
91 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 59, 83 (2016) (using Din as an "illustration of the force of
minimal process in immigration law"); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration "Disaggre-
gation" and the Mainstreaming of Immigration Law, 68 FLA. L. REV. FORuM 38,
43-44 (2016) (noting that the Din Court "avoided addressing the question of the
continued vitality of the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, a close cousin of
the plenary power doctrine, which immunizes from judicial review the visa deci-
sions of State Department consular officers"); Michael Kagan, Plenary Power Is
Dead! Long Live Plenary Power, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 26-28
(2015) (reading Din to reveal a dismantling of the plenary power doctrine around
procedural due process rights but a continuation of the doctrine around substan-
tive rights); Michael Kagan, When Immigrants Speak: The Precarious Status of
Non-Citizen Speech under the First Amendment, 57 B.C. L. REv. 1237, 1283 (2016)
(citing Din as an example of the Court's "reluctance to review substantive immi-
gration decisions"); David A. Martin, Why Immigration's Plenary Power Doctrine
Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REv. 29, 50 n.59 (2015) (characterizing Din as a "golden
opportunity" to make inroads into the plenary power doctrine); Adrian Vermeule,
Deference and Due Process, 129 HARV. L. REv. 1890, 1893 (2016) (citing Kennedy's
Din concurrence as an admirable example of judicial restraint and deference to
agency determinations of what process is due).
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this Article makes is not that cases in general must be read
together, but that reading Obergefell and Din together is partic-
ularly crucial for understanding constitutional family law in
this moment, both because of the salience of family reunifica-
tion claims in the present political climate and because the
Justices who wrote it did so while they were simultaneously
drafting their opinions in ObergefelL Scholars of constitutional
family law who treat Din as external to their field miss its im-
portant contribution to the Court's constitutional family juris-
prudence; scholars of immigration who ignore Obergefell will
miss the nuances of the positions the Justices each took in Din.
This synthesized reading of Obergefell and Din produces
two practical results. First, Obergefells approval of marriage
over non-marriage may be limited to the facts of that case, and
may not lead to increased discrimination against the unmar-
ried, or against LGBTQ people in other contexts. Second, the
Supreme Court may be close to recognizing expressly one par-
ticular "right of marriage"-the right to family reunification.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I tells the stories of
Obergefell v. Hodges and Kerry v. Din, highlighting the facts
that are important to understanding the constitutional import
of the opinions. Part II works through the opinions of the Jus-
tices in Obergefell, and Part III does the same for Din, illuminat-
ing the Justices' theories of constitutional family law and
showing how the Din opinions undercut some of the apparent
implications of ObergefelL Part IV offers some observations
about how these two opinions, taken together, point a different
way forward for both the scope of constitutional family rights
generally and the right to family reunification in particular.
I
OBERGEFELL AND DIN
Obergefell and Din both involved petitioners who claimed
rights under the constitution based on their intimate relation-
ships. In Obergefel, the petitioners were sixteen people in
same-sex relationships who either wanted their marriages rec-
ognized by their home states or wanted to be able to marry in
their home states.1 7 In Din, the petitioner was a U.S. citizen
who had attempted to secure a visa for her foreign husband so
that he could join her in the United States, and who wanted to
better understand why her petition had been denied, presuma-
bly so that she could attempt to rebut the government's posi-
17 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
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tion.18 The contours of constitutional family law doctrine were
at the heart of each case, but the factual contexts meant that
each case foregrounded different aspects of the petitioners'
constitutional claims.
A. Obergefell v. Hodges
The case known as Obergefell v. Hodges was, in actuality, a
group of cases from several district courts consolidated by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.' 9 The cases involved a variety
of petitioners. The lead petitioner, Jim Obergefell, had a partic-
ularly compelling story. He and his partner of over twenty
years, John Arthur, were residents of Ohio.20 Because Ohio
did not recognize same-sex marriage, they could not marry
there.2 1 John had been diagnosed with amyotrophic 1Lteral
sclerosis, otherwise known as ALS or Lou Gehrig's disease, a
progressive neurodegenerative disease that affects nerve cells
in the brain and spinal cord. 22 In 2013, the U.S. Supreme
Court issued its decision in United States v. Windsor, in which
it invalidated the federal Defense of Marriage Act. 2 3 Under
Windsor, the federal government could no longer refuse to rec-
ognize same-sex marriages. 24 Obergefell and Arthur decided
they wanted to marry, and, as they could not in Ohio, they
rented a medically equipped plane, flew to BWI Airport in Mary-
land, and were married on the tarmac because Arthur was too
ill to leave the plane. 25
A few weeks later, Obergefell filed a lawsuit in federal court
challenging Ohio's refusal to recognize the couple's marriage. 26
In particular, they wanted Obergefell to be listed as Arthur's
spouse on the last official document of his life-his death cer-
tificate. On that form, the state insisted it needed to refer to
Arthur as "single," leaving blank the line for surviving spouse.
Obergefell and Arthur made particularly sympathetic and
compelling plaintiffs, but so were many of the other petitioners
in the case. Michael DeLeon and Greg Bourke, for example,
had been a couple since 1981, raised two children together,
18 See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2131 (2015).
19 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593.
20 Id. at 2594.
21 Id.
22 Just What is ALS?, ALS ASSOC'N, http://www.alsa.org/about-als/ [https:/
perma.cc/KCY3-JZCU].
23 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).
24 See id. at 2695-96.
25 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594.
26 See id. at 2594-95.
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and married in Canada in 2004, but their home state of Ken-
tucky would not recognize their marriage. 2 7 They wanted their
marriage recognized so that Bourke's name could be added to
the birth certificates of their children. Similarly, Kim Franklin
and Tammy Boyd had lived in a committed relationship for
eight years before the litigation began. They had married on
the beach in Connecticut in 2010, returned to Kentucky, and
wanted Kentucky to recognize their out-of-state marriage. 2 8
Although the facts varied from case to case, the connecting link
between all of the couples was their claim that the state should
recognize their relationships so that they could be eligible for
the benefits or other forms of recognition granted by the state
to married couples alone. It was not the stigma of being re-
fused marital status that was the basis of their injury-al-
though surely this contributed to their sense that the law was
unjust. Nor were the couples asking to be permitted to have a
same-sex relationship; previous cases, most notably Lawrence
v. Texas, had established that private same-sex intimacy was
constitutionally protected. 2 9 Instead, it was the public recogni-
tion of their relationship and the particular public benefits ac-
companying that recognition that the petitioners sought.
The claims made by the Obergefell petitioners can be un-
derstood as the last step of a long series of cases leading up to
it. Constitutional family law had existed for decades, beginning
perhaps with the establishment of state authority over family
law in Maynard v. HL30 Subsequent constitutional family
case law has also imposed a norm of gender neutrality on the
allocation of marriage-based benefits and family law rules, 3 1
27 Bourke v. Beshear & Love v. Beshear - Plaintiff Profiles, ACLU, https://
www.aclu.org/other/bourke-v-beshear-love-v-beshear-plaintiff-proffles [https://
perma.cc/U6YY-AG66].
28 Id.
29 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); cf. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 184
(1964) (finding a Florida statute unconstitutional because it prohibited unmar-
ried, interracial couples from sharing a bedroom).
30 125 U.S. 190, 208-09 (1888) (holding that U.S. territory has legislative
power to dissolve a marriage against the wishes of a spouse).
31 Compare Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 456 (1981) (holding that
Louisiana's law allowing a husband to unilaterally dispose of property that was
jointly owned with his wife violated the Equal Protection Clause), and Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689-91 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (holding
that a statute which required a female officer to provide proof of the dependency of
her husband before she could access dependency benefits, when a male officer did
not have to prove his wife's dependency, violated the Due Process Clause), with
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-79 (1979) (explaining in regard to the Alabama law
which requires alimony from the husband but not the wife, "[tihe fact that the
classification expressly discriminates against men rather than women does not
protect it from scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause), and Kahn v. Shevin,
2018] 509
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curtailed discrimination against nonmarital children, 32 and ar-
ticulated a zone of privacy around decisions regarding repro-
duction.3 3 Most importantly for the Obergefell petitioners, the
Court established marriage as a fundamental right, striking
down statutes that abridged the right of marriage in various
ways, from requiring parents to demonstrate that they were
current on their child support payments before marrying to
denying female prison inmates the right to marry to banning
interracial marriage.34 These cases, however, did not articulate
the definitional question posed by Obergefell-marriage is a
fundamental right, but is same-sex marriage really marriage?
Obergefell, like Windsor before it, built on these established
right-to-marry precedents by knitting them together with the
416 U.S. 351, 351-55 (1974) (holding that a state tax law that favors women may
be permissible "if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction, or
difference in state policy." Id. at 355. (quoting Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S.
522, 528 (1959)). "The challenged tax law [here] is reasonably designed to further
the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for
whom that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden," i.e., women. As
such, it may pass scrutiny. Id. at 351).
32 See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977) (holding that an Illinois
law that allowed illegitimate children to only be able to inherit from their mother
in intestate succession, while legitimate children could inherit from both mother
and father, violated the Equal Protection Clause); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,
311 (1968) (striking down Alabama law that prevented aid from going to father-
less children whose mothers were cohabiting with "any single or married able-
bodied man"); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968) (holding that it was
"invidious discrimination" to deny damages to illegitimate children for the wrong-
ful death of their mother, as their illegitimacy had nothing to do with the wrongful
death).
33 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992)
(reaffirming the essential holding from Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1977) (holding that the prohibition
against advertising contraceptives was unconstitutional); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 117-18, 164 (1973) (finding Texas abortion statutes permitting abortions
only if the life of the mother was threatened to be unconstitutional); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 442-43 (1972) (finding Massachusetts statute banning the
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals unconstitutional); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding as unconstitutional a
Connecticut statute punishing the use of contraceptives in married couples); Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 520-21 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing, in a
case about contraceptive information and devices being withheld from married
couples, that "when the State makes '[contraceptive] use' a crime and applies the
criminal sanction to man and wife, the State has entered the innermost sanctum
of the home. . . . That is an invasion of the privacy that is implicit in a free
society."); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reL Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(holding that marriage and procreation are "one of the basic civil rights of man"
and any sterilization law's classifications should thus be given strict scrutiny).
34 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81 (1987) (female prison inmates);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375 (1978) (child support payments); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (interracial marriage).
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antidiscrimination principle used in many of the other consti-
tutional family law cases.
There is an important line of constitutional family law
cases, however, that articulates a different facet of marriage-
what one might call the "rights of marriage" rather than "the
right to marry." This line of cases concerns the household or
the lived experience of families. The most relevant here is
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, a case in which a grandmother
challenged a zoning law that prohibited her from living with her
two grandsons, each of whom had different parents.3 5 A plu-
rality of the Court found that this regulation was impermissible
because it chose to regulate "by slicing deeply into the family
itself."3 6 Although Moore involved a woman and her grandchil-
dren, not a married couple, its fundamental concern was with
the right of family members to cohabit with one another. This
concern is distinct from the right to enter into a legal relation-
ship, such as marriage. Instead, it focuses on what freedoms
the familial relationship affords to the members of the family.
This concern lies at the heart of the Supreme Court's other
2015 constitutional family law case, Kerry v. Din.
B. Kerry v. Din
Unlike Jim Obergefell, Fauzia Din has not become a house-
hold name, nor did the case bearing her name garner the con-
tinuous world-wide media coverage and intense, sustained
scholarly attention heaped on Obergefell. Din's case, however,
also had a compelling factual story and resulted in opinions
that likely contain the seeds of the Court's future constitutional
family jurisprudence.
Fauzia Din, a naturalized U.S. citizen, originally came to
the United States as an asylum-seeker from Afghanistan.3 7 Po-
litical asylum is granted to an individual who can demonstrate
past persecution or a "well-founded fear" of suffering persecu-
tion should she be returned to her home country.3 8 Ms. Din
35 431 U.S. 494, 496-97 (1977).
36 Id. at 498; see also U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 529 (1973)
(striking down Food Stamp eligibility rules that prohibited people who lived with
non-relatives from receiving aid); cf Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 1,
4 (1974) (upholding zoning law that allowed unmarried couples or families to
share a residence but prohibited "lodging, boarding, fraternity, or multiple-dwell-
ing houses"); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 636 (1986) (upholding statute requir-
ing nonrelatives or distant relatives to demonstrate that they "customarily
purchase food and prepare meals together" in order to demonstrate food stamp
eligibility).
37 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2132 (2015).
38 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).
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was granted asylum in the United States3 9 after demonstrating
a well-founded fear of persecution. Once she obtained asylum,
she was eligible to apply to become a citizen after residing
continuously in the United States for a minimum of five
years. 40 After obtaining her U.S. citizenship, she married Kan-
ishka Berashk, a man also from Afghanistan whom she had
known since childhood.4 1
One of the privileges of U.S. citizenship is the ability to
petition for a visa for an immediate relative (a spouse, child, or
parent). 42 This visa allows the relative to travel to the United
States and live there with "permanent resident" status (and,
eventually, apply for U.S. citizenship).4 3 When Fauzia Din ini-
tially petitioned for an immediate relative visa for Berashk, the
petition was granted.44 The next step was for Berashk to travel
to the nearest U.S. consulate (the consulate in Islamabad, Pa-
kistan). 45 Berashk had his interview at the consulate and then
waited. He heard nothing back from the State Department for
almost a year. 46
Din contacted her congressman, who, in turn, demanded
an explanation from the State Department.47 It sent a denial
letter, stating that Berashk was inadmissible under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (a). The statute in question is the piece of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act that lists every category of person who
is inadmissible to (prohibited from entering) the United States.
At twenty-four pages long, the statute is detailed, convoluted,
and wide-ranging, including as inadmissible everyone from
people who have not had required vaccines, to money launder-
ers, to persons who are "likely .. . to become a public charge."4 8
It would be impossible to know, based on a mere reference to
the statute, which subsection the government believed was ap-
plicable to Berashk.
39 Brief in Opposition at 3, Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (No. 13-1402), 2014 WL
4216035, at *3.
40 8 C.F.R. § 316.2(a)(3) (2011).
41 Brief of Appellant at 6, Din v. Clinton, 718 F.3d 856 (2013) (No. 10-16772),
2010 WL 6753384, at *6.
42 Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2131 ("The INA creates a special visa-application process
for aliens sponsored by 'immediate relatives' in the United States.") (citing 8
U.S.C. §§ 1151(b), 1153(a) (2012)).
43 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (2012).
44 Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2132.
45 Id.
46 Brief of Appellant, supra note 41, at 8-9.
47 See id.
48 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(2)(I), (a)(4)(A) (2012).
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Din's congressman continued to press the State Depart-
ment, which then provided more information, via email.49 Now
it identified a particular subpart of the statute-this time only a
page and a half long-as the grounds for inadmissibility. The
section it identified, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B), states that indi-
viduals involved in terrorist activity are inadmissible. At first
glance, this level of specificity might seem to be enough. But
like the inadmissibility statute in general, the anti-terrorism
provisions are extremely broad and difficult to understand. A
person can be inadmissible for having actually engaged in what
would be commonly understood as terrorist activity, for exam-
ple, hijacking an airplane or bombing a public place, but could
also be inadmissible for giving a terrorist a place to stay, pro-
viding him with money or food, or passing on a message from
one terrorist to another. To make things even more confusing,
a "terrorist organization" includes, under the statute, a "group
of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which
engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in [terrorist activ-
ity]."50 A person can be inadmissible for aiding such a group
even if he did not know that he was aiding terrorists, if he
"reasonably should [have] know[n]."5 1 In short, the "what" of
"terrorist activity" can include seemingly innocuous activity,
the "who" of "terrorist organization" can include two unorgan-
ized individuals, and the "how" can include no actual knowl-
edge of terrorism. Given the broad swath of activities that
could lead to a finding of inadmissibility, a visa applicant who
was erroneously found to have engaged in "terrorist activity"
might very well have no way to guess as to the basis of the
finding.
If the statute the State Department identified as making
Berashk inadmissible was broad, the discretion afforded to the
consular officer reviewing his case was even broader. Consular
officers are granted extraordinarily wide berth when making
decisions about whom to admit to the United States. The stat-
ute in question in Berashk's case, for example, states that a
person is inadmissible if the consular officer "has reasonable
ground to believe" that the person "is engaged in or is likely to
engage after entry in any terrorist activity." 52 Berashk may
have been excluded not because the consular officer knew of
prior terrorist activity (defined in the very broad way outlined
49 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 41, at 9.
50 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi).
51 Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv).
52 Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)((II).
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above), but because the officer suspected that Berashk was
likely to engage in such activity. The law provides no mecha-
nism for appealing a consular decision.53 The absence of an
appeal process makes it impossible for a person whose visa is
denied to effectively contest the denial, or, often, to even dis-
cover the reason for it.
In Berashk's case, neither he nor Din knew the reason for
the denial.5 4 Berashk had been employed as a postal clerk for
the Afghan government, including during the time when the
Taliban was in power.55 It is possible that the consular officer
understood paid employment by the Taliban to constitute "ter-
rorist activity." 56 The State Department, however, refused to
offer any factual explanation for the denial, pointing simply to
the text of the statute itself.
Din responded by suing the State Department. Her claim
was an interesting one: she did not demand that Berashk be
admitted to the United States, but rather that the State Depart-
ment provide her with a more detailed explanation of why he
could not be, presumably so that she could rebut it if the gov-
ernment had inaccurate information.
Fauzia Din, like Jim Obergefell and the other Obergefell
petitioners, framed her case as one about marriage rights. But
the focus of her claim was different. Where Obergefell and his
co-petitioners invoked the right to marry in order to access
certain benefits, Din invoked the right to exercise the benefits
of marriage. Jim Obergefell was seeking entry into a status
relationship that brings with it certain rights, including the
right to petition for a foreign spouse's visa. In contrast, Fauzia
Din had already exercised the right to marry; she wanted the
government to not stand in the way of her enjoyment of the
relationship it already recognized. Because Ms. Din (or her
lawyers) understood that the right to live in the same place as
one's spouse could not be absolute (prisoners, for example, are
separated from their spouses by walls; soldiers by war), she
articulated her claim as a procedural one. It flowed from a
substantive right to the companionship of one's spouse, but
the remedy she sought was due process-procedural protec-
tions to ensure that this right would not be infringed upon
without good reason and fair consideration.
53 Brief for the Petitioners at 7, Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No. 13-
1402), 2014 WL 6706838, at *7.
54 See Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2132; id. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
55 Brief in Opposition, supra note 39, at 4.
56 See Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2146 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Obergefell was a directly analogous case to the previous
right-to-marry cases, such as Zablocki, Loving, and Turner, the
only new question was whether same-sex marriage "counted"
as marriage. In contrast, Din could not be decided purely by
extending the logic of prior cases to a new class of plaintiffs.
The cases most analogous to Din were cases about parents or
other caretakers and children, not spouses, and custody and
zoning, not admission as a permanent resident. Constitutional
family law has established the right of parents to the care,
custody, and control of their children5 7 and clarified the scope
of rights enjoyed by fathers to relationships with their
nonmarital children.5 8 These cases, taken together, support
57 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000) ("[T]he Due Process
Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to
make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a 'better'
decision could be made."); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform,
431 U.S. 816, 846-47 (1977) ("Whatever liberty interest might otherwise exist in
the foster family as an institution, that interest must be substantially attenuated
where the proposed removal from the foster family is to return the child to his
natural parents."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-35 (1972) (holding that
it was unconstitutional to compel Amish parents to send their children to high
school until the age of sixteen under Wisconsin's compulsory education law, due
to parental interest in raising their children in accordance with their religious
beliefs); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (holding that while the
rights of parents are not beyond limitation, "[lt is cardinal with [the Court] that
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents . .. [in a]
private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."); Pierce v. Soc'y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (affirming lower court's decision to enjoin
enforcement of the Oregon Compulsory Education Act because it "unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399-400 (1923) (holding it unconstitutional to prohibit teaching in languages
other than English until the student passes the eighth grade. The Court recog-
nized the right to "establish a home and bring up children" as one which "may not
be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative
action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some [state] purpose.").
58 See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 128 (1996) (finding that due process
requires a state to waive judicial transcript fees for indigent appellants in parental
termination cases); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129-31 (1989) (Scalia,
J., plurality opinion) (holding that a natural father did not have visitation rights
under California's statute which presumes a child born to a married couple is the
couple's natural child, even when there is a potential biological father outside of
the marriage); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (holding that "mere
existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection,"
and a putative father is not guaranteed "substantial protection under the Due
Process Clause" unless he participates in raising the child); Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380, 386-87, 393-94 (1979) (deeming unconstitutional a New York
provision which only needs the unwed mother's lack of consent to halt adoption,
but places a higher burden on the unwed father, who must show the adoption is
against the child's interest); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649-50; 657-58
(1972) (finding it unconstitutional for Illinois law to allow fitness hearings for all
parents, except unmarried men, who want to retain custody of their children after
the death of a partner or spouse. This presumption of fitness extended to married
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"the general claim that parents' child-rearing choices are enti-
tled to strong protection," 5 9 and that parents, especially biolog-
ical mothers, have a strong interest in retaining legal custody
and parentage of their children.60 Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land, discussed above, expanded the protection of caretaker-
parent relationships to include not just parents but grandpar-
ents, and expanded the context in which the relationship can
require constitutional protection from custody and parentage
claims to zoning law and criminal punishment. 6 1 None of these
cases, however, addressed adult relationships. The cases that
have concerned adult relationships have focused on the right to
engage in intimate sexual behavior, but none of these cases
addressed the question of whether adults have an interest in
sharing a home and a citizenship. 62 Finally, the Court has
recognized that the interest of adults in the right to divorce is
so strong that filing fees must be waived for indigent people
seeking divorce.63 No U.S. Supreme Court case, however, has
taken on the issue of whether adults-married or not-have a
right to cohabit with whom they please, or under what circum-
stances the government may justifiably stand in their way.
There have been previous Supreme Court cases addressing
the rights of immigrants who were the spouses of U.S. citizens.
These cases, however, were decided before the Court developed
its modern constitutional family doctrine, and many of the jus-
tices did not recognize the interests of the parties as ones in-
volving constitutional family rights.6 4 In Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, for instance, the United States excluded the Ger-
man-born wife of a naturalized citizen without a hearing on the
ground that her admission would be "prejudicial to the inter-
or divorced couples as well as unwed women, with only unmarried men being
singled out.).
59 Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights after Troxel v. Granville,
2000 Sup. CT. REV. 279, 318.
60 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293,
308-12 (1988) (exploring, and critiquing, the Supreme Court's rights-based ap-
proach to understanding mother-child relationship).
61 431 U.S. 494, 504-06 (1977).
62 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-64 (2003) (striking down a statute
that prohibited adults from engaging in private, consensual, same sex intimacy);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding that marital pri-
vacy protects the right to contraceptive use); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453-55 (1972) (addressing the issue of marital privacy in the context of contra-
ceptive use).
63 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971).
64 See Abrams, Family Reunitcation and the Security State, supra note 12, at
259-65 (describing Cold War immigration cases and identifying them as predat-
ing the development of modem constitutional family law).
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ests of the United States." 65 As in Din, the government claimed
in Knauff that national security interests were paramount-in
Knauff's case, due to "the national emergency of World War
II."66 Unlike Ms. Din, however, Ms. Knauff did not claim a
constitutional interest in her marriage. Instead, she made a
structural constitutional claim and argued that the regulations
used were not "reasonable." 6 7 Justice Robert Jackson, how-
ever, joined in dissent by Justices Hugo Black and Felix Frank-
furter, articulated a family reunification rationale for Knauff's
claims. Congress, he argued, has the power to exclude aliens.
But it does not have the power to authorize "an abrupt and
brutal exclusion of the wife of an American citizen without a
hearing."68
Similarly, in Shaughnessy v. Meze, the Supreme Court
upheld the exclusion of another noncitizen, also the spouse of a
U.S. citizen.6 9 Both Knauff and Mezet were decided during the
Cold War, during an era of heightened suspicion against East-
ern Europeans and suspected communists. Both were also
decided prior to the line of cases decided in the 1970s that
established a procedural due process right in expectancy inter-
ests. Under these cases, even if an entitlement is not a funda-
mental right, if the government has created an expectancy to
the entitlement, it must provide procedural due process when
denying it. 7 0 Knauff and Mezei were also decided prior to the
right-to-marry cases, such as Loving, Zablocki, and Turner, as
well as the cases involving families living together, such as
Moore and Moreno.
When the Court heard Kerry v. Din, then, it was perfectly
positioned to ask again the question it had ignored in Knauff
and Mezei-do U.S. citizens have a constitutional interest in
living with their spouses?-in light of an expanded under-
standing of the constitutional protection afforded to marriage.
Put differently, now that interracial couples, prisoners, and
men who owe child support all have a right to marry, what is
the scope of the rights of marriage?
65 338 U.S. 537, 540 (1950).
66 Id. at 544.
67 Id. at 542 (discussing plaintiffs claim that the statute in question and
accompanying regulations contained unconstitutional delegations of legislative
power).
68 Id. at 550 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
69 345 U.S. 206, 217 (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that "[h]e wanted to go to
his wife and home in Buffalo").
To See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2142-43 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(first citing Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005); then citing Reno v. Flores,
507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
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C. Overlapping Constitutional Family Theories
In both Obergefell and Din, the Court was faced with the
question of whether it should expand its existing constitutional
family law jurisprudence to include new factual scenarios.
Obergefell required the Court to decide whether same-sex mar-
riage fell within the definition of "marriage" for constitutional
purposes, and whether discrimination in access to marriage
based on sexual orientation was constitutionally permissible.
Din, on the other hand, demanded that the Court decide
whether existing precedents regarding the right to live with
one's biological family members should be expanded to include
the right to live with one's spouse, and whether the right to
marry and procedural due process cases of the 1960s, 1970s,
and 1980s called into question the harsh approach taken by
the Court with regard to immigrant spouses during the Cold
War. Both cases required the Justices to articulate their un-
derstanding of why marriage is constitutionally protected-in
other words, to develop a legal theory of marriage.
Despite their different postures, Obergefell and Din con-
cerned overlapping legal claims. Admittedly, they have differ-
ent emphases. Obergefell is about the right to enter into a
status, and Din is about the right to access certain benefits
based on that status. The lines between status and benefits,
however, are murky, and when pressed, the subject areas of
the two cases blur.
Consider, for example, the claims the Obergefell plaintiffs,
as well as the plaintiffs in many other marriage rights cases,
were making. These claims were for marital recognition for its
own sake, but also for the tangible benefits marriage provides.
Indeed, prior to Obergefel, many states had attempted to ac-
commodate same-sex couples' demands for access to benefits
by creating other, non-marital statuses, such as domestic part-
nerships or civil unions, that would provide some or all of the
benefits of marriage. 7 ' The right at issue in Din-to live in the
same country as one's spouse-is, like the rights at issue in the
marriage equality cases, a right that flows from marital status.
Thus, another way of understanding Din is as a case that fo-
cuses on one of the particular rights that have been bundled
71 See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (describing
California domestic partnership act, which gave domestic partners "the same
rights, protections, and benefits, and shall be subject to the same responsibilities,
obligations, and duties under law . . . as are granted to and imposed upon
spouses" (quoting Cal. Fam. Code § 297.5(a) (West 2004)).
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into the status of marriage, rather than the entire bundle.72 No
court has ever determined which rights, bundled into the sta-
tus of marriage, are necessary to make marriage "marriage."
Surely, if the right to access health insurance through one's
spouse were taken away, or if spouses could no longer refuse to
testify against one another, their "right to marry" would not
have been abridged.
If one right were to be found fundamental to the exercise of
the right to marry, however, it would likely be the right to live
with one's spouse. Certainly, this right is sometimes overrid-
den by other, more pressing needs, as when one spouse is
incarcerated or deployed in the armed services, but for most
spouses, marriage would mean little if there was no physical
proximity. As in Moore, abridging the right of married people to
live with one another would regulate "by slicing deeply into the
family itself."7 3 Thus, even though Obergefell and Din some-
times draw from different lines of cases, the theories underly-
ing them, and their significance for constitutional family rights,
are intertwined.
In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority. Four
other Justices-Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor-
joined his opinion. None of these other Justices wrote sepa-
rately. We cannot know for certain if they agreed with Justice
Kennedy's reasoning or had other reasons for joining the opin-
ion, although Justice Ginsburg has stated that she thought "it
was more powerful" for the Court to speak with one voice.74
Some scholars have speculated about how the opinion might
had been different had it been authored by one of the other four
joining Justices.7 5 Four Justices dissented-Roberts, Alito,
Scalia, and Thomas. In contrast to the unified majority, each of
the dissenters wrote his own, sometimes quite lengthy,
opinion.
Din, although it produced fewer opinions than Obergefell,
was in one respect more complex. Unlike Obergefell, Din did
72 See James Herbie DiFonzo, Unbundling Marriage, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 31,
31 (2003) (observing that "[mlarriage is emerging as a 'bundle' of legal benefits and
burdens"); cf. Strauss, supra note 9, at 1732 (arguing that the right to marry
cannot be understood as a "[blundle of [s]imple [c]laim [rights").
73 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498 (1977) (plurality opinion).
74 Justice Ginsburg Addresses Alumni and Summer Institute in Wide-Ranging
Conversation with Siegel, DuKE L. NEWS (Aug. 7, 2015), https://1aw.duke.edu/
news/justice-ginsburg-addresses-alunmi-and-summer-institute-wide-ranging-
conversation-siegel/ [https://perma.cc/8SPY-H87H].
75 See, e.g., Ruthann Robson, Justice Ginsburg's Obergefell v. Hodges, 84
UMKC L. REv. 837 (2016) (reimagining the Obergefell opinion had Justice Gins-
burg wrote it).
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not produce a majority opinion. Although five justices agreed
on an outcome (Din lost her case), they could not agree on the
reasoning. Justice Scalia's plurality opinion garnered only two
additional votes, from Justices Thomas and Roberts. Justice
Kennedy's concurrence was signed by Justice Alito. 76 The
precedential value of Din is therefore more speculative.
Din also presents something Obergefell did not-an opinion
by Justice Breyer, one of the silent Justices in Obergefel This
dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and
Sotomayor, is notable because its theory of marriage differs
greatly from Kennedy's Obergefell majority. Reading Obergefell
and Din together produces a very different impression than
reading Obergefell alone. Din provides a window into how at
least one of those Justices who remained silent in Obergefell
understands marriage, provides differentiation between the
Justices who dissented in Obergefell, and also underscores the
limits of Justice Kennedy's approach.
II
OBERGEFELL'S THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL FAMILY LAW
Each of the opinions in Obergefell demonstrates a particu-
lar judicial theory of constitutional family law. Understanding
these theories-and especially, the differences between them-
will help us to read Obergefell in light of Dir.
A. Marriage as an Exercise of Citizenship
Justice Kennedy has long been the "swing vote" on the
Supreme Court in many categories of controversial constitu-
tional cases.7 7 In the areas of family constitutional rights, gen-
der discrimination, and sexual orientation discrimination, his
decisive role has been particularly noticeable.78
76 Richard Lazarus has argued that Din was likely originally assigned to Jus-
tice Kennedy "after fragmented voting at conference with the expectation that he
was best positioned to produce an opinion of the Court, but he was subsequently
unable to secure the necessary majority for his draft opinion." Richard J. Laza-
rus, Back to "Business" at the Supreme Court: The "Administrative Side" of Chief
Justice Roberts, 129 HARv. L. REv. FORUM 33, 52 n.120 (2015).
77 See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Process of Constitutional
Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Survellance State, 75 FORD-
HAM L. Rsv. 489, 513 (2006) (stating that "Justice Anthony Kennedy is now the
Court's swing vote").
78 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132-33 (2007) (writing an
opinion for a five-Justice majority upholding a statute that prohibits "intact"
dilation and evacuation (D & E) abortion procedure); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53,
56-57 (2001) (writing an opinion for a five-Justice majority upholding citizenship-
acquisition law that treats men and women differently).
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To understand Justice Kennedy's opinion in Obergefell, it
is important to consider it in the context of his other opinions.
In constitutional family law cases, Justice Kennedy has largely
hewn to a middle path, neither being greatly expansive in his
reading of rights nor seeking to curtail them.79 In one particu-
lar class of cases, however, Justice Kennedy has been expan-
sive in his rethinking of the law. He was the author not only of
the majority opinion in Obergefell but of every majority opinion
in significant Supreme Court cases siding with LGBTQ parties
since Romer v. Evans in 1996.80 In each of these opinions,
Justice Kennedy deviates from traditional constitutional analy-
sis in many ways, sometimes by not identifying the suspect
class at issue, sometimes by failing to state clearly the applica-
ble level of scrutiny (strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or
rational basis review), and sometimes by avoiding the question
of which constitutional provision has been violated." 1 Instead,
Justice Kennedy's opinions ask whether the legislation at issue
reflects animus toward a particular group; for Justice Kennedy,
animus, or "a bare desire to harm" is an illegitimate legislative
purpose.8 2 Whether Kennedy's unique approach has repre-
79 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 93-95 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting from majority opinion striking down state child visitation
statute on its face where statute could be read to give visitation to third parties
with a substantial relationship to the child); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102,
128-29 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (concurring with Justice Ginsburg's ma-
jority opinion holding that a state may not deny access to the transcript of the
hearing terminating parental rights to a parent too poor to pay the transcript fee,
but doing so on narrower grounds than the majority); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (oining Justice Scalia's
plurality opinion that denies visitation to the unmarried, genetic father of a child,
but refusing to join Scalia's footnote 6 that "sketches a mode of historical analysis
to be used when identifying liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment that may be somewhat inconsistent with our past
decisions in this area").
80 See 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (striking down Colorado Constitutional
Amendment 2, which banned the state and its municipalities from treating sexual
orientation as a protected class); see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675, 2682 (2013) (holding that the Defense of Marriage Act violated same sex
couples' Fifth Amendment rights to equal protection); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 562 (2003) (striking down a Texas statute that prohibited same-sex individu-
als from engaging in certain sexual acts in private).
81 See Robinson, supra note 9, at 161-63 (describing Kennedy's approach to
equal protection analysis in Windsor and Obergefel). See also Kerry Abrams &
Brandon L. Garrett, Cnukltive Constitutional Rights, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1309,
1334-45 (2017) (describing Kennedy's approach as an "intersectional rights"
analysis).
82 E.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (holding that the Constitution's guarantee
of equality must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot justify disparate treatment of that group)
(quoting Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973)); Romer, 517 U.S.
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sented a failure of precision, leading to constitutional disarray,
or is a strength of the opinions, allowing them to be read nar-
rowly going forward, has been the source of much scholarly
debate.83
This line of Kennedy opinions has also been notable for its
valorization, and, some might say, domestication, of intimate
relationships.8 4 In Lawrence v. Texas, for example, the ques-
tion before the Court was whether Texas's Homosexual Con-
duct Law, which allowed the state to criminally convict the
petitioners for consensual, private sexual activity, violated the
petitioners' constitutional rights.8 5 But Justice Kennedy's rea-
soning in striking down the statute characterized the petition-
ers' sexual encounter as valuable not for itself but because it
might lead to a longer-term relationship. "When sexuality finds
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person,"
Justice Kennedy wrote, "the conduct can be but one element in
a personal bond that is more enduring"-perhaps an "endur-
ing" personal bond such as marriage?8 6 In fact, in Lawrence,
Justice Kennedy expressly repudiated the idea that sex alone is
worthy of protection. In overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, the
1986 case that had upheld criminal bans on sexual activity
similar to those at issue in Lawrence,8 7 Justice Kennedy held
that the Court in Bowers had misapprehended the question at
hand. "To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to
at 632 (holding that the law in question's "sheer breadth is so discontinuous with
the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but
animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate
state interests").
83 See, e.g., Abrams & Garrett, supra note 81, at 1348 (observing that the
approach adopted by Justice Kennedy in the LGBTQ rights cases may result in a
form of "constitutional minimalism"); Libby Adler, The Dignity of Sex, 17 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 18-19 (2008) (arguing that Justice Kennedy's opinion in Law-
rence suggests that sex without intimacy lacks dignity); Laura A. Rosenbury &
Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 830 (2010)
(arguing that there is support in Lawrence for a narrow reading of the opinion-
one that protects sexual conduct only in the context of emotionally intimate
relationships); Teemu Ruskola, Gay Rights Versus Queer Theory: What Is Left of
Sodomy After Lawrence v. Texas?, 23 Soc. TEXr 235, 238-45 (2005) ("The Su-
preme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas Is easy to read, but difficult to pin
down." (quoting Nan Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1103, 1103
(2004))).
84 See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v.
Texas, 104 CoLuM. L. REV. 1399, 1408-10 (2004) (observing that "gay men are
portrayed as domesticated creatures, settling down into marital-like relationships
in which they can both cultivate and nurture desires for exclusivity, fidelity, and
longevity in place of other more explicitly erotic desires").
85 539 U.S. at 564.
86 Id. at 567.
87 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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engage in certain sexual contact demeans the claim the indi-
vidual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple
were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have
sexual intercourse."*8 As Professor Libby Adler has argued,
Justice Kennedy's opinion implies that sex, standing alone,
lacks dignity. It is the context in which it occurs-a committed
relationship, or even the potential for a committed relation-
ship-in which it becomes worthy of protection.8 9 Lawrence
provides an early hint of Kennedy's linkage of marriage to re-
sponsible citizenship in ObergefelL
This linkage is also evident in Justice Kennedy's attention
in Windsor to marriage as the preferred social and legal space
for the raising of children. In Windsor, Justice Kennedy's ma-
jority opinion critiqued the Defense of Marriage Act because it
"humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by
same-sex couples. The law in question makes it even more
difficult for the children to understand the integrity and close-
ness of their own family and its concord with other families in
their community and in their daily lives."9 0 Just as in Law-
rence, where Justice Kennedy transformed a case about casual
sex into one about a potential long-term relationship, in Wind-
sor, he took a case about two women who never had children
and reached a holding based, in part, on the imagined effect of
DOMA on "tens of thousands" of children.9 1 As Professor
Deborah Widiss has observed, "[niotably absent from the
Court's analysis was any recognition that in any given class-
room, there would likely be many children who have unmar-
ried, different-sex parents."9 2
Justice Kennedy's concern for same-sex couples' access to
both the burdens and obligations of marriage and his concern
for the stability of children's family relationships are under-
scored by an implicit theory regarding marriage's role in the
exercise of responsible citizenship. His Windsor opinion dis-
cusses at length the historical tradition of state, not federal
88 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
89 See Adler, supra note 83, at 18-19.
90 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013).
91 See Noa Ben-Asher, Conferring Dignity: The Metamorphosis of the Legal
Homosexual, 37 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 243, 275 (2014) ("Despite the fact that Edith
and Thea never had children, the children of same-sex couples are a key presence
throughout the Windsor decision." (footnote omitted)).
92 Deborah A. Widiss, Non-Marital Families and (or After?) Marriage Equality,
42 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 547, 555 (2015). She also notes that this argument is
"deeply in tension with efforts made a generation ago to lessen the importance-
both symbolic and substantive-of whether a child was born to a legal marriage."
ICL
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law, governing marriage. Because his discussion occurs in the
context of a dispute over federalism principles-can federal law
override state marriage law?-it is easy to overlook the extent
to which Justice Kennedy understands marriage as an exercise
of citizenship. The community of which one is a member, for
purposes of Windsor, is the state, not the nation, but citizen-
ship is nevertheless the operating principle. Consider, for ex-
ample, Justice Kennedy's characterization of New York's
decision to recognize Ms. Windsor's marriage:
Here the State's decision to give this class of persons the right
to marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of im-
mense import. When the State used its historic and essential
authority to define the marital relation in this way, its role
and its power in making the decision enhanced the recogni-
tion, dignity, and protection of the class in their own
commun ity.9 3
For Justice Kennedy, marriage is not only the most privileged
form of adult relationship, it is also the means by which states
confer legal protection and status on their citizens.
Justice Kennedy's Obergefell opinion builds on the rhetoric
begun in Lawrence and Windsor, making marriage the pre-
ferred social and legal space for sexual intimacy and childrear-
ing. It starts from the principle established in Loving, Zablocki,
and Turmer that marriage is a fundamental right.9 4 Much of the
opinion is then devoted to explaining the principles underlying
the right and how those principles and traditions apply to
same-sex couples.9 5
The first principle or tradition set forth in Kennedy's opin-
ion is one of choice and self-definition: "[Plersonal choice re-
garding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual
autonomy."96 Justice Kennedy compares choice in marriage to
other "intimate" choices, such as "choices concerning contra-
ception, family relationships, procreation, and childrearing." 97
He then cites the language from Zablocki that sets marriage
apart as the preferred family form: "Indeed, the Court has
noted it would be contradictory 'to recognize a right of privacy
with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect
to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation
93 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (emphasis added).
94 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
95 See id. at 2599-600 (applying the principle that "the right to marry is
fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other" to the
relationship of same-sex couples).
96 Id. at 2599.
97 Id.
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of the family in our society.'"98 Marriage, for Justice Kennedy,
is the legal space that makes intimacy possible: "The nature of
marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons to-
gether can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy,
and spirituality."99 This notion harkens back to the associa-
tional approach to marriage taken by Justice William Douglas
in his Griswold opinion. 0 0 Quoting the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts' opinion in Goodridge, the opinion argues that
marriage "fulfills yearnings for security, safe haven, and con-
nection that express our common humanity" and that "civil
marriage is an esteemed institution, and the decision whether
and whom to marry is among life's momentous acts of self-
definition." 0 1 This principle can be understood as an auton-
omy principle, or a self-expression principle.
It is worth taking a minute to observe just how simultane-
ously modern and regressive this theory of marriage is. Histor-
ically, marriage was less about self-definition than it was about
survival and the creation of alliances between families for self-
preservation and the consolidation of private property. 1 0 2 JUS-
tice Kennedy's version, in which marriage can help to facilitate
a person's "expression, intimacy, and spirituality" 0 3 is highly
individualistic, focused on the personal needs of the two par-
ties to the marriage and not on the well-being of the extended
family or community. Yet his opinion simultaneously revives
the strand of Zablocki's thinking in which marriage is the ap-
proved, proper space for intimate and reproductive activities,
superior to other, lesser relationship statuses. His opinion is
liberal, rather than communitarian, yet he still understands
marriage as a disciplinary institution.
Justice Kennedy's second principle is one of companion-
ship: "[The right to marry is fundamental because it supports a
two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the
committed individuals."' 0 4 It is in discussing this principle
98 Id. (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978)).
99 Id.
100 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (explaining that
there is an associational right to privacy and, in this case, "[wle deal with a right to
privacy older than the Bill of Rights .... Marriage is ... intimate to the degree of
being sacred.").
101 135 S. Ct. 2599 (quoting Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
941, 955 (Mass. 2003)).
102 For a discussion of the history of marriage, see Kerry Abrams & Peter
Brooks, Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex Couples and the Rhetoric of Accidental
Procreation, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 7-13 (2009).
103 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
104 Id.
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that Justice Kennedy makes what is perhaps the most cele-
brated and derided claim in his opinion: "Marriage responds to
the universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to
find no one there. It offers the hope of companionship and
understanding and assurance that while both still live there
will be someone to care for the other."105 This claim stands in
stark contrast to his opinion in Din, as we shall see.
Justice Kennedy's third principle is that marriage is pro-
tected because it is good for children. Marriage "safeguards
children and families and thus draws meaning from related
rights of childrearing, procreation, and education." 106 This
claim hinges on two premises: that marital children have more
legal and financial security than nonmarital children (which is
often true) and that nonmarital children are emotionally
harmed because their family form is not as good as a marital
family. "Without the recognition, stability, and predictability
marriage offers," the opinion explains, "[same-sex couples']
children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are some-
how lesser. They also suffer the significant material costs of
being raised by unmarried parents, relegated through no fault
of their own to a more difficult and uncertain family life."1 0 7
This claim, which echoes the claim in Kennedy's majority opin-
ion in Windsor that nonrecognition of same-sex marriage "hu-
miliates" the children of those couples, '0 has generated
extensive criticism that the opinion has the potential to roll
back the rights of nonmarital children.109
105 Id. at 2600. For representative characterizations of this quotation, see
Michelle Goldberg, Why the Same-Sex Marriage Decision Is a Victory for Romance,
NATION (June 29, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/why-the-same-sex-
marriage-decision-is-a-victory-for-romance/ [https://perma.c/FNW3-ZKHBI
(describing the opinion and this quotation in particular as an example of
"schmaltzy sentimentality," stating that people who get married "empty savings
accounts and go into debt to stage elaborate pageants to the ideal that Kennedy
describes" and citing to a tweet from another NATION editor referring to the opinion
as "sentimental" and "barfy").
106 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (first citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); then citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
107 Id. at 2600-01 (stating that the "marriage laws at issue here thus harm
and humiliate the children of same-sex couples").
108 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013).
109 See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 10, at 28 ("Justice Kennedy's opinion is
... an affront ... to individuals outside the institution [of marriage]."); Murray,
supra note 10, at 1258 ("[A] victory for marriage equality comes at the expense of
the unmarried and nonmarriage."); Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the
New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REv. 1185, 1191 (2016) ("[Slame-sex marriage has
the capacity to further the erosion ... between martial and nonmarital parental
recognition).
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Finally, and most curiously from a constitutional law per-
spective, Justice Kennedy's opinion asserts that marriage is
constitutionally protected because of the disciplinary control it
exerts on the citizenry. "[This Court's cases and the Nation's
traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of our social
order.""1 0 The claim is curious because it relies on a rationale
that one would expect to find in the portion of constitutional
analysis devoted to assessing the state's interest in restricting
a right."'I Instead, here the state's interest blends with the
interest in the petitioner in seeking out the disciplinary institu-
tion of marriage.11 2 Justice Kennedy describes this discipli-
nary function as peculiarly American, reaching back to
Maynard v. Hill ("the foundation of the family and of society,
without which there would be neither civilization nor pro-
gress")11s and Alexis de Tocqueville:
There is certainly no country in the world where the tie of
marriage is so much respected as in America ... [When the
American retires from the turmoil of public life to the bosom
of his family, he finds in it the image of order and of peace....
[H]e afterwards carries [that image] with him into public
affairs. " 4
It is because "[miarriage remains a building block of our na-
tional community" that the states have "throughout our history
made marriage the basis for an expanding list of governmental
rights, benefits, and responsibilities."" 5  The opinion thus
comes full circle: marriage is protected because it is the bed-
rock of society, and people should be entitled to be able to
choose to enter into this societally-important relationship in a
way that maximizes their own self-expression.11 6
110 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.
111 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) (discussing the prison's
interest in preventing unhealthy and abusive relationships between female in-
mates and male criminals); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 394 (1978) (dis-
cussing the state of Wisconsin's interest in collecting child support).
112 For more on this theory of marriage, see generally Melissa Murray, Mar-
riage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 39-51 (2012) (discussing the discipli-
nary institution of marriage).
113 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211
(1888)).
114 Id. (quoting 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 309 (Phillips
Bradley ed., Henry Reeve transl., Vintage Books rev. ed. 1990) (1945)).
115 Id.
116 For a more extended analysis of the relationship between marriage and
citizenship, see generally Kerry Abrams, Citizen Spouse, 101 CALIF. L. REv. 407,
419-29 (2013).
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B. Marriage as a Natural Right
Unlike Justice Kennedy, the Justices who dissented in
Obergefell were unwilling to read either due process or equal
protection expansively enough to include same-sex marriage.
Obergefell resulted in a somewhat unusual outcome: a majority
opinion joined by four Justices who likely did not agree with
the analysis, and four separate dissents by justices who were
largely in agreement with one another. Each of the opinions
laments the majority's overreaching' 17 and lack of doctrinal
rigor.1 18 Each, however, has distinguishing characteristics,
that, read with other constitutional family cases and with Din
in particular, illuminate some important differences in the Jus-
tices' conceptions of marriage.
1. Justice Scalia
Because he cast such a long shadow over constitutional
jurisprudence during his many years of service and was so
vocal in a few particular constitutional family cases, it is sensi-
ble to begin our analysis with Justice Scalia.
Where Justice Kennedy understands family rights as im-
portant because of the social cohesion they provide, Justice
Scalia understood family rights as natural rights that were pre-
constitutional or extra-constitutional-extremely important,
but important for legislatures, not courts, to recognize and sus-
tain. The Justice's aversion to constitutional family rights flies
below the radar in some of his opinions. Many constitutional
family cases were decided long before Justice Scalia joined the
Court, and he sometimes felt bound to existing case law under
principles of stare decisis. In these cases, however, he often
simply joined the opinion of another Justice, or wrote narrowly
117 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("[Tihis Court
is not a legislature.. . . [Flor those who believe in a government of laws, not of
men, the majority's approach is deeply disheartening."); id. at 2627 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Today's decree says that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million
Americans coast-to-coast, is a majority of the nine lawyers on the Supreme
Court. . . . This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected committee of
nine, always accompanied (as it is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the
People of the most important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves"); id.
at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("By straying from the text of the Constitution,
substantive due process exalts judges at the expense of the People from whom
they derive their authority.")
118 See id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("The majority's decision is an act
of will, not legal judgment."); id. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The stuff con-
tained in today's opinion has to diminish this Court's reputation for clear thinking
and sober analysis.").
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to make a particular point, making it clear that, had he to do it
over again, the Court never would have started down the sub-
stantive due process path.
Consider, for example, his treatment of the two chestnuts
of constitutional parental rights from the 1920s-Meyer v. Ne-
braska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters." 9 In each of these
cases, the Court held that parents had an interest under the
Due Process Clause in the care, custody, and control of their
children-in the case of Meyer, to decide that their children
would learn German, 1 2 0 and in Pierce, to decide that their chil-
dren would attend private religious school.121 These cases,
despite their Lochner-era taint, are well-established and have
been relied on in dozens of Supreme Court and thousands of
lower court opinions. But in Troxel v. Granville, in which the
Court struck down a Washington State statute that allowed
grandparents liberal rights to petition family courts for visita-
tion with their grandchildren, Justice Scalia dissented.1 2 2 In
so doing, he came as close as he could to repudiating Meyer
and Pierce without advocating for their overruling. Troxel failed
to produce a majority, with six of the nine Justices publishing a
plurality, concurrence, or dissent. This "sheer diversity" of
opinion, Justice Scalia opined,
persuades me that the theory of unenumerated parental
rights underlying [the previous] cases has small claim to
stare decisis protection. A legal principle that can be thought
to produce such diverse outcomes in the relatively simple
case before us here is not a legal principle that has induced
substantial reliance. While I would not now overrule those
earlier cases (that has not been urged), neither would I ex-
tend the theory upon which they rested to this new
context.1 2 3
In other words, parents may retain the right to care, custody,
and control of their children in the very narrow, fact-specific,
educational contexts set forth in Meyer and Pierce, but these
rights should not be extended by the Court to other contexts,
such as visitation or child custody.1 2 4
119 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923).
120 See 262 U.S. at 400.
121 See 268 U.S. at 532-35.
122 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
123 Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124 Although he did not say so in Troxel, Justice Scalia's opinion in Employ-
ment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) suggests an additional method of
distinguishing previous constitutional family cases from contemporary ones. In
Smith, Justice Scalia distinguished the case at hand-which asked whether Na-
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Justice Scalia's skepticism of family constitutional rights
was not confined to parental rights. In 1987, the year after he
joined the Court, he quietly joined Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion in Turner v. Safley, striking down prison regulations
that denied prisoners the right to marry.1 2 5 But in his numer-
ous dissents in the more recent cases, he avoided any state-
ment affirming marriage as a fundamental right. In Lawrence
v. Texas, for example, he attempted to refute the analogy be-
tween same-sex marriage bans and antimiscegenation law by
recasting Loving v. Virginia as a case that applied strict scru-
tiny solely because race was at issue.1 2 6 Loving did use this
logic, but it also, independently, struck down the statute in
question using a substantive due process rationale based on
the right to marry-a fact ignored by Justice Scalia in Law-
rence. And in United States v. Windsor, Justice Scalia declined
entirely in his dissent to discuss the line of right-to-marry
cases, noting only in passing that the idea that same-sex mar-
riage is "deeply rooted in history and tradition . . . would of
course be quite absurd."l 27 The Justice's hostility to the con-
stitutionalization of LGBTQ rights is clear from passages such
as this one. But more surprising and interesting is his whole-
sale hostility to the recognition of family constitutional rights-
for anyone, including heterosexual married couples and mar-
ried parents.
It is not that Justice Scalia did not approve of such fami-
lies. Indeed, references in many cases not only disparaged gay
and lesbian families but also treated the marital family as su-
perior to the genetic.1 2 8 Rather, he did not believe that the
tive Americans had a right to ingest peyote as part of a religious ritual-from
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972), a case that had exempted Amish
parents from sending their children to public school past the eighth grade. In
Smith, Scalia argued that because the parents in Yoder were asserting a "hybrid"
right-a combination of free exercise of religion and a liberty interest in their
children-the claim there was stronger than the pure free exercise claim in Smith.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. Thus, Justice Scalia used a rights doctrine he disfa-
vored in some contexts (substantive due process) as a sword to help to circum-
scribe another rights doctrine (free exercise).
125 482 U.S. 78, 81 (1987).
126 539 U.S. 558, 600 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In Loving, however, we
correctly applied heightened scrutiny, rather than the usual rational-basis review,
because the Virginia statute was 'designed to maintain White Supremacy.'" (quot-
ing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967))).
127 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2707 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
128 Consider, for example, Scalia's differential treatment in parentage dispute
of the child's genetic mother's husband versus the child's genetic father in Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). The law, Scalia argued, must choose one
father or the other, and "[olne of them will pay a price for asserting that 'free-
dom'-Michael by being unable to act as father of the child he has adulterously
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Constitution was the appropriate place to seek legal protection
of the family. His extensive Troxel dissent offers the most re-
vealing glimpse into his ideas about the family and the Consti-
tution, and, although it deals with parental rights, likely
represented his views on marriage rights as well. "In my view,"
he explained, "a right of parents to direct the upbringing of
their children is among the 'unalienable Rights' with which the
Declaration of Independence proclaims 'all men . . . are en-
dowed by their Creator.'"1 29 These rights, then, are very impor-
tant, and would have been understood as such by the men who
established our form of government. The Declaration of Inde-
pendence was not the only place where Justice Scalia found
evidence of the importance of family rights: "in my view that
right is also among the othe[r] [rights] retained by the people
which the Ninth Amendment says the Constitution's enumera-
tion of rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage." 3 0
For Justice Scalia, however, evidence that the founders consid-
ered these rights important is emphatically not evidence that
they provided a constitutional mechanism for their protection:
The Declaration of Independence, however, is not a legal pre-
scription conferring powers upon the courts; and the Consti-
tution's refusal to "deny or disparage" other rights is far
removed from affirming any one of them, and even further
removed from authorizing judges to identify what they might
be, and to enforce the judges' list against laws duly enacted
by the people. Consequently, while I would think it entirely
compatible with the commitment to representative democ-
racy set forth in the founding documents to argue, in legisla-
tive chambers or in electoral campaigns, that the State has
no power to interfere with parents' authority over the rearing
of their children, I do not believe that the power which the
Constitution confers upon me as ajudge entitles me to deny
legal effect to laws that (in my view) infringe upon what is (in
my view) that unenumerated right. 131
Dean David Meyer has described Scalia's treatment of the
Ninth Amendment in this passage as "a sort of constitutional
black hole, a gateway into a vacuum of nonlegal, unenforceable
rights."l 32 The Justice would likely have countered this accu-
begotten, or Gerald by being unable to preserve the integrity of the traditional
family unit he and Victoria have established." Id. at 130.
129 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (altera-
tion in original).
130 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
131 Id. at 91-92.
132 David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy after Troxel and Car-
hart, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1125, 1146 (2001). This position, Meyer notes, puts Scalia
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sation in two ways: first, by arguing that these rights are so
deeply rooted that the people would be unlikely to vote to
abridge them (by, for example, voting to abolish marriage alto-
gether) and second, by pointing to equal protection as a poten-
tial alternative mechanism for assuring equity. Consider again
Justice Scalia's recasting of Loving v. Virginia as a case solely
about race. Since the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the
use of race to discriminate against individuals, the logic would
go, discrimination in marriage based on race is impermissible,
and there is no need to resort to an analysis of whether the
right to marry is "fundamental" or not. 133
Occasionally, Justice Scalia's constitutional family law
opinions were surprising. In 2013, for example, he dissented
in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, a case in which the majority
opinion, written by Justice Alito, construed the Indian Child
Welfare Act to allow termination of parental rights where the
genetic parent never had custody of the child.13 4 Justice Scalia
disagreed with Justice Alito's parsing of the statute, but also
chose in his dissent to comment on the case:
The Court's opinion, it seems to me, needlessly demeans the
rights of parenthood. It has been the constant practice of the
common law to respect the entitlement of those who bring a
child into the world to raise that child. We do not inquire
whether leaving a child with his parents is 'in the best inter-
est of the child.' It sometimes is not; he would be better off
raised by someone else. But parents have their rights, no
less than children do. This father wants to raise his daugh-
ter, and the statute amply protects his right to do so. There is
no reason in law or policy to dilute that protection. 3 5
This statement, of course, is not a constitutional one.
Here, Justice Scalia referred to the common law, and his opin-
ions references "rights" under the common law, not the Four-
teenth Amendment. Without understanding this context, the
strong defense of the parent-child relationship comes as a sur-
prise given his position in constitutional family cases.
in "diametric opposition" to that taken by Justice Thomas, who would have given
the mother in Troxel the maximum protection offered by strict scrutiny to protect
her fundamental right to care, custody, and control of her child. Meyer, supra
note 13, at 552 n.135 (2008).
133 See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 n.1 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part) (arguing that
there was no need to inquire into whether a ban on interracial marriages was
supported by "tradition" because it violated the text of the Equal Protection
Clause).
134 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (2013).
135 Id. at 2572 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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There is an "on/off" quality to Justice Scalia's characteriza-
tion of fundamental rights not always shared by the other Jus-
tices. For Scalia, the bogeyman of constitutional law was the
idea that once something has been declared a "fundamental
right" it takes on a tremendously powerful status, and can
trump even very important state interests.13 6 It is this fear that
appears to animate his hostility toward procedural due process
claims. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., for example, he recast a
procedural claim as a substantive one, and once it was sub-
stantive, it was easy to conclude that the petitioner had no
such right.' 3 7 Procedural claims are more incremental, and
more contestable in specific cases. If a court recognizes a
claim, for example, that someone has a "constitutional liberty
interest" in marriage or parenting, it does not necessarily follow
that the interest is absolute.' 3 8 Many of the other Troxel con-
currences and dissents understood this well, arguing that a
parent's liberty interest needed to be balanced with other inter-
ests, such as the interests of the child. 1 Understanding
Scalia's extreme hostility requires understanding that for him,
the stakes seemed very high indeed.
Justice Scalia's attitude toward constitutional marriage
rights in Obergefell is not particularly surprising given the posi-
tions he took in other constitutional family law cases.1 4 0 His
consistent position in all of these cases has been that there
simply is no constitutional right to the protection of the fam-
ily-despite the family's important traditional role in American
society. 141 Thus, his position in Obergefell is not simply that
LGBTQ people have no right to marry-although he would
agree with that statement-but rather that there is no constitu-
tional right to marry-for anyone, gay or straight.1 42
136 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2621-22 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (questioning the reasoning of the majority opinion by asking why the
same logic would not authorize marriage of more than two people).
137 491 U.S. 110, 116-27 (1989).
138 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81 (1987) (striking down prison
regulations in a particular context for a particular class of plaintiffs).
139 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 76-77 (2000) (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (discussing a parent's right to direct the upbringing of children); id. at 80
(Thomas, J., concurring) (same); id. at 100 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (same).
140 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113; Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91 (Scalia J., dissenting).
141 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Michael H., 491 U.S. at
113; 7)-oxel, 530 U.S. at 91 (Scalia J., dissenting).
142 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2629-30 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Constitution does not guarantee an enumerated parental right as pre-
scribed by the majority of the Court).
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Where Justice Kennedy's opinion reaches to find unifying
themes justifying its holding, Justice Scalia's stretches to repu-
diate established Supreme Court precedents to limit funda-
mental rights to those he believed were anticipated by the
framers of the Constitution. The opinion reaches new levels of
sarcasm even for the Justice most known for taking a derisive
tone in his opinions.1 43 For example, in response to the major-
ity's claim that "[tihe nature of marriage is that, through its
enduring bond, two persons together can find other freedoms,
such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality," the Justice re-
marked, "Really? Who ever thought that intimacy and spiritu-
ality [whatever that means] were freedoms? And if intimacy is,
one would think Freedom of Intimacy is abridged rather than
expanded by marriage. Ask the nearest hippie. Expression,
sure enough, is a freedom, but anyone in a long-lasting mar-
riage will attest that that happy state constricts, rather than
expands, what one can prudently say."1 44
Many others have commented on the extraordinary "vitriol"
employed by Justice Scalia in ObergefelL 14 5 What has some-
times been lost in these analyses is that the target of his vitriol
is not LGBTQ people-although, as the people whose rights are
at issue in the case, it would be difficult not to take the rancor
personally-but the recognition of family constitutional rights
per se, and the particular, seemingly unmoored, legal con-
struction of these rights by Justice Kennedy. Justice Scalia
probably really would have wanted to "hide his head in a
bag"14 6 for joining such an opinion, because his view of the
Constitution is that it addresses only a very narrow class of
143 See Louis Michael Seidman, The Triumph of Gay Marriage and the Failure
of Constitutional Law, 2015 Sup. CT. REv. 115, 117-18 (stating that "[in the entire
history of the Supreme Court, there is nothing that rivals it for petulance, name
calling, and disrespect").
144 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
145 See Seidman, supra note 143, at 117; see, e.g., Brian Christopher Jones,
Disparaging the Supreme Court, Part H: Questioning Institutional Legitimacy, 2016
Wis. L. REv. 239, 252 (arguing that "the harshness of the language used in the
Obergefell dissents taints the Court's authentic constitutional discourse, making
it appear abundantly and overtly political"); Paula Stamps Duston, Letter to the
Editor, Antonin Scalia's Sarcasm Unbecoming of a Supreme Court Justice, Bos.
GLOBE (July 4, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/letters/2015/07/
03/scalia-sarcasm-unbecoming-supreme-court-justice/LdYUSbQC6m5Pn6
CNWZlbcL/story.html [https://perma.cc/9SQN-APHU] (arguing that the Justice
should step down); see also Richard L. Hasen, The Most Sarcastic Justice, 18
GREEN BAG 2d 215 (2015) (arguing, prior to Obergefell, that Justice Scalia was, as
an empirical matter, the most sarcastic justice on the Court).
146 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2630 n.22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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questions and that the answers to these questions are
unchanging.
2. Justice Thomas
Similarly, Justice Thomas adopts an originalist methodol-
ogy in his Obergefell dissent, one that does not disparage mar-
riage but instead the idea that family rights are constitutional
rights. Justice Thomas's dissent focuses more specifically on
the notion of "liberty" as it is used in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. For Justice Thomas, the "liberty" referred to in the Due
Process Clause is the same "liberty" protected by Magna Carta,
a "liberty from physical restraint."147 Even if, Justice Thomas
then argues, the framers might have recognized a "natural
right" to marriage that fell within their concept of "liberty," this
right "would not have included a right to governmental recogni-
tion and benefits."14 8 All this right would have entailed would
be the private right to engage in activity unencumbered by the
state: "making vows, holding religious ceremonies celebrating
those vows, raising children, and otherwise enjoying the society
of one's spouse .... At the founding, such conduct was under-
stood to predate government, not to flow from it."149
Justice Thomas's libertarian view of marriage understands
it as a negative right, not a positive one. 1 5 0 For Justice
Thomas, Jim Obergefell and the other plaintiffs had not been
denied their right to liberty because "they have been able to
cohabitate and raise their children in peace . . [and t]hey have
been able to travel freely around the country, making their
homes where they please." 15 1 He notes:
[The petitioners] do not ask this Court to order the States to
stop restricting their ability to enter same-sex relationships,
to engage in intimate behavior, to make vows to their part-
ners in public ceremonies, to engage in religious wedding
ceremonies, to hold themselves out as married, or to raise
147 Id. at 2633 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 2636.
149 Id.
150 For a contrasting view, see Strauss, supra note 9, at 1694 (arguing that
marriage is an example of a "power right"-a right to create legal duties).
151 135 S. Ct. at 2635. Justice Thomas's opinion here seems to conflict with
his dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, in which he observed that "punishing someone
for expressing his sexual preference through noncommercial consensual conduct
with another adult does not appear to be a worthy way to expend valuable law
enforcement resources" but declined to find the law an infringement on the plain-
tiffs' liberty. 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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children.... Instead, the States have refused to grant them
governmental entitlements.1 5 2
Professor Louis Michael Seidman, writing in the wake of
Obergefel, noted that this position is typical for Justice
Thomas and,
If adopted... would lead to wholesale overruling of scores of
cases extending over almost a century, on subjects ranging
from incorporation of Bill of Rights protections against the
states, to procedural due process cases, to decisions protect-
ing against government prohibitions on contraception, abor-
tion, private schooling, and family living arrangements.1 5 3
Despite its radical departure from the Court's constitutional
doctrine, Thomas's dissent is notable for its understanding of
marriage as a pre-constitutional, natural right-very similar to
the "right to parent" articulated by Justice Scalia in TroxeL
"Petitioners misunderstand the institution of marriage when
they say that it would 'mean little' absent governmental recog-
nition"; 15 4 for Thomas, marriage is outside government recogni-
tion entirely.
3. Chief Justice Roberts
Although Chief Justice Roberts wrote the lengthiest of the
ObergefeU dissents, his is the least interesting for our pur-
poses. The Chief Justice carries the water for the dissenting
team by setting forth in great detail the constitutional view that
substantive due process is dangerous, with the usual analysis
of Dred Scott and Lochner.15 5 He also spends several pages
lamenting the Court's intrusion into what he views as a funda-
mentally political decision. 5 6 There is one moment, however,
in the opinion that seems anomalous. In his critique of the
majority's equal protection analysis, he notes that the claims
brought by petitioners in the case "target the laws defining
marriage generally rather than those allocating benefits specifi-
cally."' 57 He then goes on to say that "the equal protection
analysis might be different, in my view, if we were confronted
with a more focused challenge to the denial of certain tangible
benefits," or, perhaps, to a particular class of noncitizens de-
nied admission. 5 s This sentence suggests that the Chief Jus-
152 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2635.
153 Seidman, supra note 143, at 119 (footnotes omitted).
154 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2636.
155 Id. at 2615-17 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 2624-26.
157 1 at 2623.
158 Id.
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tice might be open to claims of discrimination made by LGBT
plaintiffs over specific benefits. 15 9 Professor Melissa Murray
has also argued that the Chief Justice's dissent suggests that
marital status discrimination could violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. 160
4. Justice Alito
Professor Neil Siegel has argued that Justice Alito's ap-
proach to constitutional cases is that of a "traditional conserva-
tive": unlike Justices Scalia and Thomas, who are both
originalists, Justice Alito's methodology varies from case to
case, but his conclusions support traditionally conservative
ends. 16 1 In Professor Siegel's words, "in light of Justice Scalia's
passing, Justice Alito has become the primary judicial voice of
the many millions of Americans who appear to be losing the
culture wars, including in battles over gay rights, women's ac-
cess to reproductive healthcare, affirmative action, and relig-
ious exemptions."1 6 2 Justice Alito's privileging of conservative
values stands in sharp contrast to Justice Scalia, a conserva-
tive who nonetheless sometimes wrote or joined opinions with
"liberal" outcomes due to his originalist methodology. 163
Indeed, Justice Alito's Obergefell dissent follows this trajec-
tory. Justice Alito reiterates the dominant rationale used by
states in defending same-sex marriage bans throughout much
of the early 2000s-that the purpose of marriage is to support
responsible procreation by heterosexual couples. 164 For the
majority, Justice Alito notes, the purpose of marriage is that it
"provides emotional fulfillment and the promise of support in
159 See Ronny Hamed-Troyansky, Erasing "Gay" From the Blackboard: The
Unconstitutionality of "No Promo Homo" Education Laws, 20 U.C. DAvIS J. JUV. L. &
POL'Y 85, 113 (2016) (stating that Roberts's dissent "may reinforce the legal argu-
ment against [certain] education laws").
160 Murray, supra note 10, at 1251.
161 Neil S. Siegel, The Distinctive Role of Justice Samuel Alito: From a Politics of
Restoration to a Politics of Dissent, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 164, 166 (2016).
162 Id. at 165.
163 For an extended comparison, see Brianne J. Gorod, Sam Alito: The Court's
Most Consistent Conservative, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 362, 371-72 (2017), quoting
Justice Scalia as saying: "I'm a law-and-order type,... but I ought to be the pin-
up for the criminal defense bar, because my originalist philosophy leads me to
defend rigorously the right to jury trial, to defend the original meaning of the
confrontation clause-all of which benefits criminal defendants, who I would
rather see put away. But once you show me the original thinking, I am hand-
cuffed. I cannot do the nasty conservative things I would like to do to the
country.").
164 See Abrams & Brooks, supra note 102 (discussing history of "accidental
procreation" argument in same-sex marriage litigation).
2 0181] 537
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
times of need."165 He then observes that the governmental in-
terest in Kennedy's view of marriage is that "by benefiting per-
sons who choose to wed, marriage indirectly benefits society
because persons who live in stable, fulfilling, and supportive
relationships make better citizens."l 66 He then contrasts his
own view that marriage is not about "the happiness of persons
who choose to marry" but instead was "[flor millennia . . .
inextricably linked to the one thing that only an opposite-sex
couple can do: procreate."1 6 7 There are, he argues, "reasonable
secular grounds for restricting marriage to opposite-sex
couples," because only they need legal encouragement to en-
gage in "potentially procreative conduct . . . within a lasting
unit that has long been thought to provide the best atmosphere
for raising children."16 8
The dissent's last section also melds together two familiar
conservative arguments-first, the argument that the
Obergefell majority is usurping authority from the political
branches, and second, that the opinion itself will cause harm to
Americans with traditional values. The opinion, Justice Alito
warns,
[WIill be used to vilify Americans who are unwilling to assent
to the new orthodoxy. . . . I assume that those who cling to
the old beliefs will be able to whisper their thoughts in the
recesses of their homes, but if they repeat these views in
public, they will risk being labeled as bigots and treated as
such by governments, employers, and schools.' 69
Perhaps the most important aspect of Justice Alito's opin-
ion for future cases is that he does not repudiate the line of
cases that articulate the right to marry (Loving, Zablocki, Tur-
ner) and right of families to live together (Moore). In fact, he is
the only one of the dissenters to not join Chief Justice Robert's
dissent, with its long, cautionary history of Lochner and its
progeny.17 0 It appears that Justice Alito does believe in a con-
stitutional right to marry, and perhaps not simply based on
stare decisis grounds. He simply does not believe that the right
protects what the majority thinks it does-the right to personal
fulfillment and the exercise of citizenship. Instead, for Justice
Alito, the right to marry is the right to engage in an institution
165 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2641 (Alito, J., dissenting).
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 2642-43.
170 Id. at 2611, 2640.
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intended to cabin procreative sex and channel it into a stable,
long-term relationship. 17 1 It is, fundamentally, a right for
heterosexuals, but a right, nevertheless.
5. Distinguishing the Dissenters
With the four dissenting Justices in Obergefell, then, we
see four different articulations of a natural, pre-constitutional
right to marry. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas both view
this right as both pre- and extra- constitutional; not only did
the right predate the Constitution, but it also was never incor-
porated into the Constitution. The main difference between the
two seems to lie in whether there is a negative right to marry.
Justice Scalia would leave this issue completely to the demo-
cratic process; Justice Thomas intimates that some depriva-
tions of liberty might create cognizable constitutional harm.
Each of them, given the opportunity, would happily overturn
many constitutional precedents (Justice Thomas, perhaps, all
of them). Chief Justice Roberts, in contrast, would find such a
move destabilizing, but is very cautious about further balloon-
ing substantive due process rights beyond what he views as
already dangerously extended. Justice Alto stands alone as a
dissenter who really does dissent against same-sex marriage
itself, rather than the constitutional method used by the major-
ity. His notion of marriage as a "fundamental" right does not
mean that it exists outside the Constitution.1 7 2 Rather, the
"fundamental" for Justice Alito can be enshrined in the Consti-
tution, 173 because it reflects the truth of human experience.
This distinction between Justice Alito and other Obergefell dis-
senters becomes clearer, as we shall see, when read alongside
Din.
III
DIN's THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL FAMILY LAW
Read alone, Obergefell appears to create a sharp contrast
between five Justices who believe that the right of same-sex
couples to marry can be comfortably lodged in substantive due
process, equal protection, or both, and four sharply dissenting
Justices who object to the extension of the law. But as we have
171 For the classic exposition of family law's "channeling function," see Carl E.
Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 495, 498
(1992) (arguing that "in the channeling function the law creates or (more often)
supports social institutions which are thought to serve desirable ends").
172 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2641 (Alito, J., dissenting)
173 Id.
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seen, the dissenting opinions are more nuanced than that cari-
cature, and differ from each other in important ways. Too,
most scholars are skeptical that the four Justices who joined
Justice Kennedy's opinion were entirely comfortable with its
analysis.17 4 Nevertheless, Obergefell is fairly easy to read in a
way that creates sharp divisions between two sets of politically
and methodologically divided Justices.
Read alongside Din, however, the Obergefell opinions take
on a different cast. The extreme originalist views of Justices
Scalia and Thomas are more sharply foregrounded. Justice
Scalia's plurality opinion in Din, joined by Chief Justice Rob-
erts and Justice Alito, uses history selectively to paint a picture
of the past that, while technically accurate, misses the larger
picture.' 7 5 This plurality, read with Obergefel, highlights the
ways in which originalist methodology can be used to undercut
even rights that were firmly established at the founding. Jus-
tice Kennedy's Din concurrence appears at face value to contra-
dict much of his soaring rhetoric in Obergefell but reading
Obergefell with close attention to Justice Kennedy's emphasis
on citizenship helps to reconcile the cases. Justice Alito's deci-
sion to join Justice Kennedy's Din concurrence makes sense,
given his non-originalist dissent in Obergefell, and provides a
clue as to what he might do in future cases. Finally, Justice
Breyer's Din dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and
Sotomayor, offers a justification for constitutional protection of
marriage that stands in stark contrast to Obergefel's paean to
the institution.' 7 6 The dissent may tell us more about what at
least one of the Justices who remained silent in Obergefell
thinks about marriage rights and LGBTQ rights more broadly
than the Obergefell majority itself.
A. Marriage as a Natural Right in Din
Kerry v. Din begins with a plurality opinion written by Jus-
tice Scalia and joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice
Roberts. 1" So far, we have established that Justice Scalia's
stance toward constitutional family rights was that under a
proper reading of the Constitution, they did not exist, but that
the Court had (unfortunately) recognized them in the past, and
174 See, e.g., Robson, supra note 75, passitm (arguing that if Justice Ginsburg
had instead wrote the Obergefell opinion the holding would have been grounded in
the Equal Protection Clause, rather than the Due Process Clause, and would have
been less sentimental and more doctrinally rigorous).
175 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2131 (2015).
176 Id. at 2142 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 2131 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
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the Court should go no further.17 8 These arguments took full
bloom in the late Justice's plurality opinion in Din.
Recall that Din put the question before the Court of
whether Fauzia Din had a procedural due process interest in
her marriage to Kanishka Berashk such that she was entitled
to an explanation for his visa denial. Justice Scalia understood
this claim more expansively than she articulated it-in line
with his usual impulse to understand due process claims as
claims about "fundamental rights" that can trump important
state interests rather than as narrower questions of procedural
justice. For Scalia, Din's claim was that the denial of her hus-
band's visa was a "depriv[ation] ... of her constitutional right
to live in the United States with her spouse."' 7 9
Justice Scalia's opinion then followed the logic one would
expect based on his prior opinions and those he joined. Just as
Justice Thomas would ground "liberty" in Magna Carta ten
days later in his Obergefell dissent, 's 0 Justice Scalia here ar-
gued that neither Din nor Berashk had experienced a "depriva-
tion of liberty" as understood by Magna Carta or the treatise
writers read by the founders, which would have required physi-
cal restraint ("keeping [her] against h[er] will in a private house,
putting h[er] in the stocks, arresting or forcibly detaining h[er]
in the street").' 8 ' Of course, the Court has recognized liberty
interests in the family context that go far beyond physical re-
straint, and so the opinion focused on demonstrating why the
particular claims made by Din were beyond the scope of the
rights already articulated by the Court in previous constitu-
tional family cases.18 2 In making this case, the Justice again
took swipes at Meyer and Pierce without expressly calling for
their overrule ("[d]espite this historical evidence, this Court has
seen fit on several occasions to expand the meaning of 'liberty'
under the Due Process Clause"; "I think it worth explaining
why, even if one accepts the textually unsupportable doctrine
of implied fundamental rights, Din's arguments would fail"). '8 3
In order for Din's claim to be recognized as a constitutional
right, for Justice Scalia, she would need to show that the right
she had articulated was "deeply rooted in [the] Nation's history
178 See d at 2131.
179 Id.
180 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2632-33 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
181 Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2133 (first citing 1 WILuAM BLACKSTONE, COmmENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 125 (1769); and then quoting id. at 132).
182 See id. at 2133-34.
183 Id. at 2133.
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and tradition." 184 To demonstrate the lack of such a history,
Justice Scalia made the astonishing claim that "a long practice
of regulating spousal immigration" belied any such history.1 8 5
Although he was correct that spousal immigration had been
"regulated," the historical record clearly shows a strong prefer-
ence for spousal immigration over other types, with judges
often interpreting statutes to allow for spousal immigration
even when those very statutes seemed designed to curtail it. 186
In his characterization of the history of family reunification
claims, Justice Scalia's opinion is remarkable for its careful
cherry-picking of the historical record. I am probably in a bet-
ter position than many to notice this, as the Justice relied in
part on my publications to create his alternative history. 187
Carefully choosing one of the most xenophobic moments in
American history as his example, Justice Scalia observed that
in the 1920s, when Congress first imposed national origins
quotas, there were often not enough spots to accommodate all
of the immigrants who wished to join their spouses in the
United States. 188 In focusing on this narrow, three-year win-
dow, he quickly brushed aside decades during which immigra-
tion was not regulated at all ("[a]lthough immnigration was
effectively unregulated prior to 1875") and ignored the copious
historical evidence that even after Congress attempted to limit
spousal immigration, courts often ignored these prescriptions,
finding ways to construe statutes to protect the marital rela-
tionship,1 89 as well as the evidence that exceptions to the gen-
184 Id.
185 Id. at 2135.
186 Id. at 2133.
187 Id. at 2136 (citing Kerry Abrams, What Makes the Family Special?, 80 U.
CHI. L. REv. 7, 13 (2013) [hereinafter Abrams, What Makes the Family Special?).
188 Id.
189 Id. at 2135; see Abrams, What Makes the Family Special?, supra note 187,
at 10 (noting that "[miost immigration was unrestricted, but even when Congress
did restrict immigration-such as through the various Chinese exclusion acts-
these acts were notably enforced in ways that still allowed a woman to enter if she
was married to a man who was eligible for admission" (footnote omitted)); see also
MARTHA GARDNER, THE QUALITIES OF A CITIZEN: WOMEN, IMMIGRATION, AND CITIZENSHIP,
1870-1965, at 93 (2005) (demonstrating how married women were admitted but
single women labeled "likely to become a public charge" or "LPC"); Kerry Abrams,
The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law, 62 VAND. L. REV.
1353, 1403 (2009) (arguing that laws such as the Homestead Act were intended to
facilitate the immigration of wives); Kerry Abrams, Peacefid Penetration: Proxy
Marriage, Same-Sex Marriage, and Recognition, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REv. 141,
159-60 (2012) (showing how courts liberally construed immigration quota laws to
facilitate immigration of wives) [hereinafter Abrams, Peacefid Penetration]; id. at
163-64 (showing how courts construed proxy marriages as valid for immigration
purposes even after Congress banned them); Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitu-
tion, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 641, 687
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erally expansive rule of spousal reunification were almost
always advancing a white supremacist agenda. 190
Justice Scalia next attempted to explain away the strong
history of deference to the marital relationship by rooting this
deference in coverture, the legal doctrine under which women
lost their separate identity upon marriage. Citing to the Expa-
triation Act of 1907, which provided that "any American
woman who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her
husband," 19 1 the Justice argued that "a woman in Din's posi-
tion not only lacked a liberty interest that might be affected by
the Government's disposition of her husband's visa applica-
tion, she lost her own rights as a citizen upon marriage."1 92 In
other words, because marriage was an institution that made
gender-based distinctions and protected the relationship rights
of men but not women, there is no general "deeply rooted"
practice of protection for the marital relationship. The Justice
(2005) (showing how courts allowed entrance of Chinese wives of merchants in
contrast to text of law); Todd Stevens, Tender Ties: Husbands' Rights and Racial
Exclusion in Chinese Marriage Cases, 1882-1924, 27 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 271,
273-74 (2002) (showing that courts construed statutes to exempt wives of Ameri-
can citizens of Chinese ancestry from certificate requirement because husbands
had the right to the "care and comfort" of their wives).
190 See, e.g., Abrams, What Makes the Family Special?, supra note 187, at 13
(stating that the "family preferences developed as a side note in a raging debate
over the quotas themselves-which census should determine the quotas and,
accordingly, what the racial makeup of the country would be. The institutional
design questions that lawmakers were grappling with were primarily racial and
cultural questions; the family preference aspects of these questions appear to
have been decided reflexively, based on common understandings of family func-
tion and gender roles within the family, without much thought or discussion");
see also CANDICE LEWIs BREDBENNER, A NATIONALEiY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE,
AND THE LAW OF CIIZENSHIP passim (1998) (tracing history of derivative citizenship
and demonstrating how changes to derivative citizenship rules persisted in ra-
cially restricting immigration); Abrams, Peacefil Penetration, supra note 189, at
154 (describing purposes of National Origins Act of 1924); Rose Cuison Villazor,
The Other Loving: Uncovering the Federal Government's Racial Regulation of Mar-
riage, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1361 (2011); Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian
American History and the Loss of Citizenship through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV.
405, 482 (2005) (arguing that the history of dependent citizenship and marital
expatriation shows how notions of incapacity were foundational to "racial and
gendered disenfranchisement from formal citizenship"); cf. Kerry Abrams & R.
Kent Piacenti, Immigration's Family Values, 100 VA. L. REv. 629, 703-04 (2014)
(showing how preferences for marital and genetic relationships have racialized
consequences); Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship
and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134, 2137
(2014) (arguing that an important yet overlooked reason for the development of
gender- and marriage-based derivative citizenship law was that officials' felt the
need to enforce racially nativist policies).
191 Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2135 (citing Expatriation Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-193,
Ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228 (1907)).
192 IL
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acknowledged that this type of discrimination is no longer ac-
ceptable ("[m]odern equal-protection doctrine casts substantial
doubt on the permissibility of such asymmetric treatment of
women citizens in the immigration context, and modern moral
judgment rejects the premises of such a legal order"), but con-
cluded that because there was a recent practice of preferring
the relationship rights of men over those of women that there
could be no general, deeply rooted practice. 193
Imagine for a moment an alternative, but still originalist,
opinion. Justice Scalia could have found, using the same his-
torical record he mined to support his argument, that family
reunification has long been considered a fundamental right,
"deeply rooted in history and tradition." There was far more
evidence in favor of this proposition than against it. He then
could have found that, in the 1970s, the Court began to recog-
nize gender discrimination as covered by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and that principles of stare decisis require the
Court to continue to recognize it as such.19 4 He then could
have concluded that the fundamental right to family reunifica-
tion had to be applied in a gender-neutral way.
Like his opinion in Obergefell, however, the Din plurality is
consistent with Justice Scalia's understanding of marriage and
family rights as pre-constitutional, extra-constitutional, natu-
ral rights. Equal protection is of no help under his theory,
because equality is a one-way ratchet, used to justify the cur-
tailing of what was once understood as a right of husbands and
fathers rather than the extension of that right to all. As many
other scholars have previously noted, there are many unfortu-
nate practices in our nation's history that are "deeply
rooted."19 5
193 Id. at 2136.
194 In other cases, the Justice was skeptical that gender discrimination should
receive intermediate scrutiny at all, and appears to have applied the rule solely
out of deference to precedent, but he did nevertheless advocate applying the rule.
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (remarking that "[w]e have no established criterion for 'intermediate scrutiny'
either, but essentially apply it when it seems like a good idea to load the dice"); id.
at 570 ("To reject the Court's disposition today, however, it is not necessary to
accept my view that the Court's made-up tests cannot displace longstanding
national traditions as the primary determinant of what the Constitution means. It
is only necessary to apply honestly the test the Court has been applying to sex-
based classifications for the past two decades.").
195 See David A. Strauss, 7radition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1699, 1713 (1991) (arguing that gender discrimination, school prayer, and
malapportioned legislatures are "deeply rooted" traditions); see also Katharine T.
Bartlett, Tradition, Change, and the Idea of Progress in Feminist Thought, 1995
Wis. L. REv. 303, 328 ("Scalia's view of tradition is .. . a jurisprudence of domi-
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How do we understand Justice Thomas's and Chief Justice
Roberts's decision to join Justice Scalia's plurality opinion?
The opinion is certainly consistent with Justice Thomas's views
of "liberty," and as discussed above, even draws upon the same
argument in Thomas's Obergefell dissent to root the concept of
"liberty" in Magna Carta. In addition, the opinion is consistent
with Chief Justice Roberts's Obergefell dissent in its reluctance
to enunciate "new" fundamental rights under substantive due
process. The decision to join the plurality in Din highlights just
how leery of substantive due process the Chief Justice is. His
admonitions in Obergefell that, regardless of one's personal
stance on LGBTQ rights, the expansion of doctrine in the Ken-
nedy majority is disturbing, seem even more sincere read in
light of Dirt He would consistently refuse to expand the rights
the Court has recognized under substantive due process to a
variety of cases, involving many different categories of people,
not just gays and lesbians.
B. Marriage as an Exercise of Citizenship in Din
Let us turn now to Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Din,
joined only by Justice Alito. The contrast between Justice Ken-
nedy's Obergefell majority opinion and his concurrence in Din
is arguably the most incongruous in all of these opinions. The
Justice Kennedy of Obergefell is broadly protective of the
couple's desire to marry, to choose whom to marry, to be with
that person of choice, to protect children through the marital
bond, and to be a responsible citizen through participation in
society's most venerated institution. In contrast, Justice Ken-
nedy's concurrence in Din has remarkably little to say about
the importance of marriage for the individual or for society.
Recall that the central claim in Din was whether Fauzia Din
was entitled to a better reason than "anti-terrorism" for the
government's refusal to grant her husband a spousal visa to
live in the United States.19 6 One could imagine the Justice
Kennedy of Obergefell discussing the right to spousal reunifica-
tion in the same terms as he did there, something like this: Din
had the right to choose whom she married; living with her
husband would offer her "companionship and understanding
and assurance that while both still live there will be someone to
care for the other"; 19 7 having their father in their lives would
nance and submission, in which decisionmakers of the present are required to
respect a prior authority and [arel denied active collaboration in reshaping it.").
196 See Di, 135 S. Ct. at 2131-32.
197 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
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protect any children they had from suffering "the stigma of
knowing their families are somehow lesser": and living as a
marital unit would envelop Din and Berashk in the protection
of the "social order."198 His Obergefell theory of marriage im-
plies that married couples should be together ("[m]arriage re-
sponds to the universal fear that a lonely person might call out
only to find no one there"19 9 ) and that marriage is an important
part of cultural assimilation and civic participation-an impor-
tant step, in the case of a naturalized citizen like Din and
potential immigrant like Berashk, in the couple's integration
into the American polity.
But Justice Kennedy's Din concurrence does no such
thing. Instead, the opinion barely mentions marriage at all.
The concurrence finds it unnecessary to decide "whether a citi-
zen has a protected liberty interest in the visa application of her
alien spouse" because, "even assuming she has such an inter-
est, the Government satisfied due process when it notified
Din's husband that his visa was denied under the immigration
statute's terrorism bar."200 Kennedy's opinion then compares
Din's request for process to a similar request made by Ameri-
can professors who wished to meet in person with a communist
sympathizer in the 1972 case of Kletindienst v. MandeL20 1
Mandel concerned Ernest Mandel, a Belgian citizen, pro-
fessional journalist and editor-in-chief of La Gauche, the liter-
ally-named Belgian Left Socialist weekly. 202 Mandel published
a two-volume Marxist Economic Theory book in 1969.203 Al-
though he claimed he was not a member of the Communist
Party, Mandel freely admitted that he was an advocate of the
economic, governmental, and international doctrines of world
communism. Mandel intended to visit the United States to
speak at a conference on Technology and the Third World at
Stanford University. 204 When news of the conference became
public, he also received invitations to speak at Princeton, Am-
herst, Columbia, and Vassar. 205 U.S. Immigration authorities
denied his visa request on the grounds that he previously vio-
lated the terms of his visa. 206
198 Id at 2590.
199 Id. at 2600.
200 Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
201 See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 759-62 (1972).
202 Id. at 756.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 757.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 755.
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The claim at issue in the portion of the case that ultimately
reached the Supreme Court was brought not by Mandel but by
the U.S. citizen professors who wished to hear him speak. The
professors claimed that their First Amendment right to associa-
tion was abridged by their inability to meet Mandel in person
(ultimately, he gave his lecture over the phone). 20 7 The Court
agreed that, all things being equal, it is easier to communicate
and "associate" with someone in person. But scholarly ex-
change can occur through reading translations of papers and
books or through a phone conversation. 2 0 8 In Din, Justice
Kennedy expressly analogizes the two cases: "Like the profes-
sors who sought an audience with Dr. Mandel, Din claims her
constitutional rights were burdened by the denial of a visa to a
noncitizen, namely her husband. And as in Mandel, the Gov-
ernment provided a reason for the visa denial: It concluded
Din's husband was inadmissible under [the statute's] terrorism
bar." 209 But although scholarly exchange can happen over the
phone, it is difficult to imagine that marriage-at least, Justice
Kennedy's Obergefell image of marriage-can work well that
way. What happened to the idea that marriage "responds to
the universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to
find no one there"? 2 10
Contrasted with the soaring prose of Obergefell, the Din
concurrence is surprisingly miserly. It seems inconceivable
that Justice Kennedy could really believe that the desire to be
with one's spouse is equivalent to the desire to engage in face-
to-face academic debate. His Obergefell opinion describes mar-
riage as so unique, special, and exalted in comparison with
other very significant relationships that the move in Din to
compare marriage to a scholarly exchange is jarring. And yet,
Justice Kennedy was likely drafting his opinions in Obergefell
and Din nearly simultaneously.
The clearest way to reconcile the two Kennedy opinions is
to understand them both as conceiving of the individual as a
responsible citizen of the state. The virtue of marriage, accord-
ing to the fourth principle outlined in the Obergefell opinion, is
that marriage is the "building block of our national commu-
nity"; 2 11 by subjecting one's most personal relationship to the
control of the state, the individual furthers the state's projects
207 Id. at 760.
208 See id. at 765 (noting the Government's argument that books, speeches,
and technological advancements may supplant physical presence).
209 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2139-40 (2015).
210 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
211 Id. at 2601.
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and contributes to the stability and security of all. Read this
way, the fourth principle of Obergefell is the most important,
and the other three are simply supported by it. Din in turn is
about the security of the national community but in a very
different way: national security could be threatened by the pen-
etration of the citizenry through the marriage of a citizen to a
terrorist.2 12 Marriage, then, is an important exercise of self-
expression and personal choice, but always within the context
of its greater purpose-to provide stability and structure
through the social and legal control of a benign but powerful
sovereign.
Indeed, Justice Kennedy's Din concurrence goes out of its
way to confine its holding to the counter-terrorism context.
The opinion notes the exceptionalism of the statute under
which Berashk was found inadmissible: only the counter-ter-
rorism statute does not require the government to state with
specificity which provision of law made an alien inadmissi-
ble. 2 1 3 The implication is that more process would be due if the
government interests were weaker. Terrorism alone stands as
a ground for exclusion without a specific explanation. 2 14 Mar-
riage supports good citizenship, but not at the expense of pub-
lic safety.
This reading is strengthened by turning to Justice Ken-
nedy's majority opinion in Tuan Anh Nguyen v. United States, a
2001 case concerning derivative citizenship. 2 15 In holding gen-
der-discriminatory citizenship transmission laws constitu-
tional, Justice Kennedy emphasized the importance of national
cohesion and membership, and the facilitation of this tie
through the parent-child bond. 216 For mothers, "the opportu-
nity for a meaningful relationship between citizen parent and
child inheres in the very event of birth," but "[gliven the
9-month interval between conception and birth, it is not al-
ways certain that a father will know that a child was conceived,
212 Ruthann Robson suggests that this interest in maintaining national bor-
ders may also be an interest in maintaining racial purity. See Robson, supra note
75, at 855 ("This almost complete deference occurs not only in the context of
executive power but also with reference to the racialized subjects in this immigra-
tion case, albeit without explicit references to race, only nationality."). For analy-
sis of an historical analogue in the form of Japanese "picture brides," see Abrams,
Peaceful Penetration, supra note 189, at 143-54; for an analysis of similar restric-
tions on Japanese war brides, see Villazor, supra note 190, at 1405-15.
213 135 S. Ct. at 2140.
214 I explore this aspect of Din in more detail in Abrams, Family Reunfication
and the Security State, supra note 12, at 274-79.
215 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
216 Id at 63-65.
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nor is it always clear that even the mother will be sure of the
father's identity." 2 17 Citizenship is transmitted and exper-
lenced, for Justice Kennedy, through relationships that shape
and sustain the citizen. The government's interest in a loyal
and acculturated citizenry is "too profound to be satisfied
merely by conducting a DNA test."2 18 Justice Kennedy ties
family rights inextricably to the responsibilities of citizenship,
whether it be citizenship in a community, a state, or a nation.
Why does Justice Alito join Kennedy's concurrence in Din?
Although we should not read too much into the Justice's deci-
sion to join one opinion rather than another when we have no
opinion of his own to consider, it does seem that there was
either something attractive to Justice Alito about Justice Ken-
nedy's concurrence or something repugnant about Justice
Scalia's plurality. Recall that Justice Alito was the only dis-
senter in Obergefell who did not object to substantive due pro-
cess in general, nor the "right to marry" articulated as a
substantive due process liberty interest in particular. 2 19 In
contrast to the other "conservative" Justices, Justice Alito's
conservatism appears to be about conservative values rather
than a methodology-originalism-often associated with con-
servatism. 220 Indeed, one amicus brief filed in Din on behalf of
Fauzia Din was filed by several religious organizations, who
leveraged the constitutional family law canon, including Meyer,
Pierce, and Moore, to support the notion that the traditional
family is protected both because of fundamental rights but also
because it is of "societal value."22 1 Paying close attention to
Justice Alito's dissent in Obergefell helps to identify the theo-
retical commonalities with Kennedy's majority in that case.
They come together in Din to simultaneously affirm the impor-
tance of family while emphasizing duty to country and the exer-
cise of responsible citizenship.
217 I at 65.
218 Id. at 67.
219 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2640-43 (2015).
220 Justice Alito's conservatism appears to transcend subject areas. See, e.g.,
Gorod, supra note 163, at 369-72 (arguing that Justice Alito is more consistently
conservative than Chief Justice Roberts); Michael McCall, Madhavi M. McCall &
Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the 2014-15 United States Supreme
Court Term, 61 S.D. L. Rsv. 242, 250 n.55 (2016) (stating that "Justice Alito has
the most conservative voting record in criminal justice cases over the course of the
Roberts Court era to date").
221 Brief of Amid Curiae National Justice for Our Neighbors et al. at 2-3, Kerry
v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No. 13-1402) ("[The Constitution protects the
sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." (quoting Moore v. City of Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977))).
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C. Marriage as an Expectancy Interest in Din
Unlike Justices Kennedy and Scalia, Justice Breyer did not
write in both ObergefeUl and Din.2 2 2 He, along with Justices
Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor, was silent in Obergefell,
electing to join Justice Kennedy's majority opinion. 223 But
Justice Breyer did write a dissent in Din, joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor, and the theory of constitu-
tional family law represented by that dissent stands in sharp
contrast to the one at play in both Kennedy's Obergefell major-
ity opinion and his Din concurrence. 224
Justice Breyer's Din dissent is best understood in light of
his more general approach to constitutional questions. Unlike
Justices Scalia and Kennedy, Justice Breyer's approach to con-
stitutional family law questions is difficult to ascertain. He has
not written a single opinion in any of the major constitutional
family law or LGBTQ rights cases, and even in cases that pro-
duced several opinions he has generally chosen to join the
plurality or majority rather than join a concurrence or dissent
or write one himself.2 2 5 The closest case we have is arguably
Stenberg v. Carhart, in which the Justice wrote the majority
opinion in a case striking down a Nebraska statute that
criminalized "partial birth abortion," but even this case gives us
little insight into how he would address issues of first impres-
sion, as his method there was an application of the "undue
burden" approach outlined in previous cases. 2 2 6 Understand-
ing Justice Breyer's approach, then, requires taking a broader
look at his jurisprudence outside the constitutional family law
context.
Generally speaking, Justice Breyer's approach has been
incremental, pragmatic, and comfortable with understanding
222 See 135 S. Ct. at 2591; 135 S. Ct. at 2130.
223 See 135 S. Ct. at 2591.
224 See 135 S. Ct. at 2141.
225 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000). Troxel generated one plu-
rality opinion, two concurrences, and three dissents, but Justice Breyer signed
onto Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion. See also United States v. Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675, 2681 (2013) (Justice Breyer joined Justice Kennedy's majority opin-
ion, with dissents filed by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, and Chief Justice
Roberts); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 561 (2003) (Justice Breyer joined
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, with a concurrence filed by Justice O'Connor
and a dissent filed by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 106 (1996) (Justice Breyer signed
onto Ginsburg's majority opinion, with dissents filed by Justices Rehnquist and
Thomas and joined by Scalia).
226 530 U.S. 914, 945-46 (2000).
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rights as principles to be balanced with other factors. 2 2 7 Al-
though in his book Active Liberty the Justice advocated for an
anti-originalist, open-ended approach to constitutional adjudi-
cation, his actual decisions have been marked less by expan-
sive activism than by deep pragmatism and fact-based
decision-making. 228 Facts always matter to Justice Breyer;
simply saying that something is a "constitutional right," for
him, begs the question of the whether the particular govern-
ment activity in question violates that right.229
Consider, for example, Justice Breyer's deciding votes in
two cases challenging public displays of the Ten Command-
ments. In McCreary County v. ACLU, Justice Breyer went with
the five-Justice majority in invalidating a display of the Ten
Commandments in a Kentucky county court.230 The majority
opinion rejected the displays as violations of the First Amend-
ment's prohibition of the establishment of religion. In contrast,
in Van Orden v. Perry, he switched sides, writing a plurality
opinion comparing the history of the displays. 23 1 Because the
Texas display had been donated by the Fraternal Order of Elks,
had not been the subject of complaints or controversy for de-
cades, and was situated among "17 monuments and 21 histori-
cal markers" 2 3 2 -including heroes of the Alamo, Confederate
soldiers, and Texas schoolchildren-he found it not an estab-
lishment of religion but instead meant to convey a secular mes-
sage about the history of Texas.233
McCreary and Van Orden both concerned a textual consti-
tutional prohibition on the establishment of religion, but Jus-
tice Breyer's pragmatic approach to constitutional law can also
apply to implied rights and, indeed, appears to make him much
more comfortable with the idea of "proliferation" of "fundamen-
tal" rights than some of the other Justices. 2 3 4 If naming some-
thing a fundamental right means that it trumps every other
227 Consider, for example, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699-702 (2001) in
which Breyer reads a six-month limitation into a statute providing for indefinite
detention of immigration detainees.
228 See STEPHEN BREYER, AcTivE LIBERTY 116-20 (2005).
229 See id. at 120-24 (explaining that in judicial decision making, Justice
Breyer emphasizes considerations of relevant circumstances and consequences).
230 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005).
231 545 U.S. 677, 699-705 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (Justice Breyer at-
tached a map of the Capitol Monument to his opinion to show the context of the
display).
232 Id. at 681.
233 Id. at 703-04.
234 See BREYER, supra note 228, at 132 (emphasizing that Justice Breyer views
judicial advancement of fundamental rights as a goal the Constitution seeks to
fulfill).
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interest, then it follows that the number of fundamental rights
should be small. In contrast, if, as Justice Breyer believes,
designating something a fundamental right means that the
government's interest in abridging it must be balanced with the
individual's interest in the right, then a multitude of funda-
mental rights is not as threatening. They may be fundamental,
but they are far from absolute. In short, Justice Breyer's posi-
tions have been notable for their focus on flexibility over for-
malism, paying close attention to the specific circumstances of
particular situations.2 3 5
Justice Breyer's Din dissent squares with these jurispru-
dential tendencies. At first, Justice Breyer sounds like he
might be starting to engage the same lionization of marriage as
an institution that Justice Kennedy did in ObergefeL "[The
institution of marriage, which encompasses the right of
spouses to live together and to raise a family, is central to
human life, requires and enjoys community support, and plays
a central role in most individuals' 'orderly pursuit of happi-
ness.'"236 But then the opinion turns sharply in another direc-
tion. Immigration law, Justice Breyer contends, "surrounds
marriage with a host of legal protections to the point that it
creates a strong expectation that government will not deprive
married individuals of their freedom to live together without
strong reasons and (in individual cases) without fair proce-
dure." 2 3 7 In other words, even if marriage were not a centrally
important institution, the law has made it so, and once people
develop legal expectations around what marriage means, the
government cannot arbitrarily deprive them of those
expectations.
This vision is evident from the very way Justice Breyer
characterizes Din's claim. "The liberty interest that Ms. Din
seeks to protect," he opines, "consists of her freedom to live
together with her husband in the United States."238 He then
highlights the relatively narrow nature of her claim: "She seeks
procedural, not substantive, protection for this freedom." 23 9
Unlike the Obergefell majority, which sets marriage over
and against other adult relationships as enduring, historically-
235 See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S.
727, 740-41 (1996) (characterizing First Amendment doctrine as having adopted
its principles "to the balance of competing interests and the special circumstances
of each field of application").
236 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2142 (2015).
237 1 at 2143.
238 Id. at 2142.
239 Id.
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revered, and spiritually-significant institutions, the Din dissent
understands civil marriage as a status created and recognized
by the state. Having "surround[ed] marriage with a host of
legal protections," Justice Breyer explains, the state has cre-
ated a "strong expectation that government will not deprive
married individuals of their freedom to live together without
strong reasons and (in individual cases) without fair proce-
dure." 2 4 0 This emphasis on the state, rather than on the moral
superiority of those who chose to marry, stands in stark con-
trast to the Obergefell majority's view of marriage as a timeless,
pre-legal institution that the state must acknowledge.
The dissent adopts a version of the "equal access" argu-
ment, advocated by scholars Nelson Tebbe and Deborah
Widiss, although sounding in procedural due process more
than in equal protection. 2 4 1 Tebbe and Widiss argue against a
fundamental right to marry on the grounds that civil marriage
is a "government program that provides certain benefits and
imposes certain obligations." 2 4 2 Civil marriage, they argue, is
different from "other family-related liberties, such as rights
that protect decisions regarding child rearing, procreation,
contraception use, or termination of a pregnancy." 243 "All of
those rights exist independent of government involvement, and
all of them enjoy protection against state interference under
substantive due process doctrine." 24 4
Tebbe and Widiss advocate for the use of equal protection
doctrine to realize their "equal access" theory, and in the case
of same-sex marriage, that approach would make sense. In the
Din dissent, where the problem was not obviously class-based
discrimination (although the case does have racial and na-
tional-origin overtones), procedural due process is the mecha-
nism, but equal access is still the theory. There, Justice Breyer
takes the equal access argument to its logical conclusion, com-
paring civil marriage to other rights or privileges grants to indi-
viduals by the government, including the "right not to be
suspended from school class," "a prisoner's right against invol-
untary commitment," "the right to welfare benefits," or the
"right not to take psychotropic drugs." 2 4 5 None of these rights
240 Id. at 2143.
241 Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1380-1382 (2010).
242 Id. at 1378.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2143.
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is a "fundamental right,"2 46 protected by the Constitution.
Rather, each is an example of a privilege that the government
has induced people to expect. 24 7 Once the government
promises such a privilege, it cannot arbitrarily deprive people of
it. This does not mean that the government cannot restrict
these rights, but it must provide "due process" in doing so.
Surely, Justice Breyer argues, if the government provides pro-
cedural due process when it deprives prisoners of "'goodtime'
credits" that shorten their length of incarceration, or when a
school tries to suspend a student, it must provide process
when it deprives a U.S. citizen of the "freedom to live together
with her spouse in America."24 8
Justice Breyer's conception of procedural due process is
flexible. In some cases, such as criminal prosecutions, people
are entitled to extensive process, including the right to counsel
and to confront the witnesses against them through cross-ex-
amination. In other cases, procedural due process rights might
be minimal. In Din's case, for example, she was not asking for
full-blown criminal due process rights, but something much
more modest: an explanation. She wanted the government to
give her more information about what her husband was ac-
cused of doing. In other words, she wanted an explanation of
"lwhy the government acted as it did." 2 4 9 Properly apprised of
the grounds for the Government's action," Justice Breyer ex-
plains, "Ms. Din can then take appropriate action-whether
this amounts to an appeal, internal agency review, or (as is
likely here) an opportunity to submit additional evidence and
obtain reconsideration." 2 5 0 The reason that the government
did give-the terrorism grounds for inadmissibility-is not
enough for Justice Breyer because it lacks specificity. He
would give the government two options, either: (1) disclose the
facts that support the claim that Berashk was involved in ter-
rorist activity or (2) disclose a "sufficiently specific statutory
subsection that conveys effectively the same information." 2 5 1
The issue here is not whether marriage is a fundamental right,
but whether it is one of many, many interests that the govern-
ment has chosen to protect. Yet, its fundamental nature has
rhetoric punch: "How could a Constitution that protects indi-
viduals against the arbitrary deprivation of so diverse a set of
246 Id at 2142.
247 Id. at 2143-44.
248 Id at 2143.
249 Id. at 2144.
250 Id at 2145.
251 Id at 2143.
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interests not also offer some form of procedural protection to a
citizen threatened with governmental deprivation of her free-
dom to live together with her spouse in America?" 252
Notice what Breyer's opinion does not do-it does not cre-
ate a fundamental right that can then be abridged only if the
government meets its burden under a strict scrutiny analy-
sis.253 None of the Justices opining in these two marriage
cases argues for this traditional approach (save those Justices
who, in dissent, claim that the majorities could not have met
the burden such an approach would require). Justice Breyer's
Din dissent is not the traditional, three-tiers of scrutiny, funda-
mental rights approach some scholars would prefer.254 The
traditional approach, so long considered the bedrock of consti-
tutional analysis in Fourteenth Amendment cases, is indeed
dying, but not solely because of Justice Kennedy's looser for-
mulations.2 55 Justice Breyer's approach is just as different in
its own way.
IV
IMPLICATIONS
It is too soon to know what the long-term fallout from ei-
ther of these decisions will be. Those who hoped that Din
would sound the death knell of robust immigration power have
been disappointed. Many who hoped that Obergefell would end
discrimination against same-sex couples have been disturbed
by the force of the backlash in the form of a call for religious
exemptions to anti-discrimination law. Anti-minority rhetoric,
during and following the 2016 presidential election, has
targeted many groups, including the LGBTQ community and
immigrants. 256 Despite our limited ability to predict the future
252 Id. at 2145.
253 This change in approach, more commonly associated with Justice Ken-
nedy, was presciently noticed by David Meyer in 2001 in his analysis of the
fragmented decision in TroxeL "Through the rising smoke of this battleground,"
he wrote, "there emerges apparent consensus about a point of tremendous signifi-
cance: The daunting complexity of family relationships commands special caution
and flexibility in formulating any constitutional rules of decision. This point is
important because it signals an approach to family-privacy controversies that is
quite different from the rigid, heavy-handed scrutiny prescribed by conventional
fundamental rights doctrine." Meyer, supra note 132, at 1146 (footnote omitted).
254 Compare to the analysis in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
255 Indeed, consider Justice Kennedy's very traditional approach, using tiered
scrutiny, in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2016).
256 See Elizabeth Sepper, Doctoring Discrimination in the Same-Sex Marriage
Debates, 89 IND. L.J. 703, 703 (2014) (arguing "that same-sex marriage objec-
tions lack the distinct and compelling features of conscientious objection recog-
nized by law").
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in 2018, however, reading Obergefell together with Din makes
each opinion take on a different cast than it does alone, and
simultaneously offers new arguments for the potential broad-
ening and contracting of civil rights in the constitutional family
context. This last Part takes up the possibility that reading
Obergefell and Din in light of each other points to markedly
different future outcomes than either case read alone.
A. The Scope of Civil Rights
First, the two cases read together indicate that the scope of
the rights of unmarried people and the rights of LGBTQ people
beyond marriage may be different from what scholars have
thought. Justice Kennedy's views on the importance of mar-
riage appear even more focused on the constraining force of
responsible citizenship when read in conjunction with Din. But
Justice Breyer's Din dissent provides a counterweight that may
more accurately reflect the opinions of the other Justices who
joined the majority in ObergefeL
Justice Kennedy's ObergefeU opinion, taken alone, appears
to put unmarried people and their children in jeopardy. 257 In a
society in which over half of us are unmarried, and over 40% of
children are born to unmarried parents, a Supreme Court
opinion expressly preferring marriage to nonmarriage is of seri-
ous concern.2 58 According to its critics, Obergefell suffers in
two respects-by denigrating parents who choose not to marry,
and by denigrating unmarried people, with or without children,
as inferior to married people.
Scholars critiquing Obergefell along these lines worry that
previous Supreme Court opinions that designated illegitimacy
as a quasi-suspect classification for equal protection purposes
will be read in ways that castigate nonmarital families. Al-
though this line of cases protected nonmarital children from
discrimination, their reasoning often included a "the sins of the
parents [should] not [be] visited [upon] their innocent children"
rationale. 259 Under this theory, illegitimacy could still be con-
sidered an undesirable trait, and parents, but not their chil-
dren, might still be punished for it or incentivized to marry.260
257 See Huntington, supra note 10, at 23; Murray, supra note 10, at 1210.
258 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW FAMIIUES 1,
19-20 (2010), http: / /www.pewsocialtrends. org/files/20 10/11/pew-social-
trends-2010-families.pdf [https://perma.ce/S5T3-EZ3J].
259 Melissa Murray, What's So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J.
GENDER, Soc. POLY & L. 387, 394 (2012).
260 See Richard L. Brown, Disinheriting the "Legal Orphan": Inheritance Rights
of Children after Terrination of Parental Rights, 70 MO. L. REv. 125, 158 (2005)
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As Professor Melissa Murray has noted, Justice Kennedy's
rhetoric in Obergefell tilts strongly in the "sins of the parents"
direction, asserting that "children of nonmarital relationships
'suffer the significant material costs of being raised by unmar-
ried parents, relegated through no fault of their own to a more
difficult and uncertain family life.'"26 1 Not only does Obergefell
treat the choice not to marry as "utterly unimaginable," it also
denigrates single people, whose "intimate lives lack the dignity,
transcendence, and purpose that come with knowing that they
are a part of a 'two-person union unlike any other in its impor-
tance.'"262 Thus, for Murray, Obergefell portrays marriage as
"the most profound, dignified, and fundamental institution into
which individuals may enter" and therefore implies that alter-
natives to marriage are "by comparison undignified, less
profound, and less valuable."2 63
Similarly, Clare Huntington has celebrated the outcome of
Obergefell but lamented its reasoning. 26 According to Hunt-
ington, the substantive due process analysis undertaken by
the Obergefell majority required the Court to define what mar-
riage means and explain its social importance, and it chose to
define it in a constraining and conservative way. 2 6 5 An equal
protection analysis, instead, would have allowed the Court to
bypass having to define marriage. Instead, the analysis could
have simply been that "whatever marriage means culturally, a
state cannot deny access to it without distinctions that have a
state (as opposed to a private, cultural) interest as a basis."266
Instead, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, Huntington ar-
gues, is likely to further reify unfortunate aspects of family law
by reinforcing the notion that the "typical" family is married.26 7
It is unclear, however, whether Obergefell's more effusive
descriptions, such as the infamous "call[ing] out" phrase 268 are
central to the holding or mere rhetorical flourish. Even those
(characterizing Supreme Court precedent as "impatien[t] with statutes that pun-
ish innocent children for the wrongdoing of their parents"). But see Murray, supra
note 259, at 394-99 (disputing conventional "progress narrative" of a "more lib-
eral era where the sins of the parents would not be visited upon the children").
261 Melissa Murray, supra note 10, at 1215 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015)).
262 Id. at 1215-16 (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599).
263 Id. at 1210.
264 Huntington, supra note 10, at 23.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 28.
267 Id. at 30.
268 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015) ("Marriage responds to
the universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to find no one there.").
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statements that clearly are central, such as the assertion that
lack of access to marriage "humiliates" children of gay and
lesbian couples, do not necessarily imply that discrimination
against these couples would be constitutional were marriage
available. 269 As Douglas NeJaime has observed, LGBTQ advo-
cates have achieved increased protections for nonmarital
parenting simultaneous to and in conjunction with their advo-
cacy around marriage equality. 270 Courtney Joslin has further
argued that Obergefell, when read in light of the decriminaliza-
tion of nonmarital sex set forth in cases such as Lawrence v.
Texas, may stand for the proposition that "our 'evolving exper-
iences' must be considered," and that, given the large number
of unmarried Americans, our "evolving experiences" are likely
to include a recognition of the dignity of unmarried life. 2 7 1
Adding Din complicates the equation. Justice Kennedy's
Din plurality sharply undercuts the scope of the marital rights
he affirmed in Obergefell by tying the enjoyment of these rights
to the exercise of responsible citizenship. The act of marrying
is itself revealed to be just one way an individual can exercise
responsible citizenship, and a very important one. Choosing
not to marry could very well be, for Justice Kennedy, an act of
irresponsibility, akin to Din's marriage to a suspected terrorist,
that undercuts the claim to family-based rights.
However, the Breyer dissent in Din suggests that the sup-
port for a fundamental right of marriage among the Obergefell
majority Justices is more fractured and tenuous than the opin-
ion on its face suggests. Understanding marriage as an expec-
tancy interest puts it on much different footing then
understanding it as the means by which people discover their
most evolved spiritual selves. To highlight the difference, let us
consider two quotations from the two opinions concerning the
reason why the state supports marriage through benefits.
First, Justice Kennedy:
[Jiust as a couple vows to support each other, so does society
pledge to support the couple, offering symbolic recognition
269 See NeJaime, supra note 9, at 2347 (arguing that precedent may lead
courts to treat gays and lesbians as full participants in the space of nonmarital
parenthood); see also In re Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d 488, 498 (N.Y. 2016) (holding
that the "foundational premise of heterosexual parenting and nonrecognition of
same-sex couples is unsustainable, particularly in light of the enactment of same-
sex marriage ... and the ... holding in Obergefell v. Hodges ... which noted that
the right to marry provides benefits not only for same-sex couples, but also the
children being raised by those couples").
270 NeJaime, supra note 109, at 1187.
271 Courtney G. Joslin, Marriage Equality and Its Relationship to Family Law,
129 HARV. L. REv. FORUM 197, 211 (2016).
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and material benefits to protect and nourish the union. In-
deed, while the States are in general free to vary the benefits
they confer on all married couples, they have throughout our
history made marriage the basis for an expanding list of gov-
ernmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities. 2 7 2
Now, Justice Breyer:
[The law, including visa law, surrounds marriage with a host
of legal protections to the point that it creates a strong expec-
tation that government will not deprive married individuals of
their freedom to live together without strong reasons and (in
individual cases) without fair procedure. 2 7 3
For Kennedy, the primary reason that the government attaches
benefits of marriage is "to protect and nourish the union." 274
The government, remember, has a strong interest in social or-
der and in preferring marriage over other social arrangements.
For Breyer, the decision to tie benefits to marriage is more
historically contingent: although marriage has played, and cur-
rently does play, a central role in most individuals' "orderly
pursuit of happiness," 275 it is quite possible to imagine other
arrangements between individuals and the state that would
foster adult welfare and stability for children.
Consider now the Chief Justice's mention in Obergefell of
an alternative argument that might have persuaded him: "The
equal protection analysis might be different, in my view, if we
were confronted with a more focused challenge to the denial of
certain tangible benefits."276 This statement, while somewhat
cryptic, indicates at least openness to considering equal pro-
tection claims brought by members of classes not deemed "sus-
pect." Thus, unmarried people themselves and not just their
children might be able to effectively bring claims of discrimina-
tion if they could show that distinctions made on the basis of
marital status are arbitrary, irrational, or based in animus.
Similarly, the two cases read together point to a different
outcome for the future of LGBTQ rights. During the Obergefell
litigation and after the opinions were issued, many scholars
and activists expressed concern that by reifying marriage, the
ObergefeU majority was limiting its holding to the marriage
context. What about housing discrimination, employment dis-
crimination, public harassment, hate crimes, and the many
272 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.
273 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2143 (2015).
274 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.
275 Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2143 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923)).
276 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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other ways in which LGBTQ people are treated unequally? And
what about plaintiffs who did not "perform" traditional mar-
riage and traditional values as well as Jim Obergefell and the
other plaintiffs in the marriage cases? As Professor Cary
Franklin put it, gaining the right to marry "would benefit gays
and lesbians whose foremost desire was to settle down with
someone of the same sex, 'adopt[] kids . . . go[ ] to church,
coach[ ] little league, [and] collect[ ] stamps,"' but would be less
helpful and might even "stigmatize-those whose interests ran
to pursuits other than monogamy and stamp-collecting." 277
As with the question of nonmarital families, the broader
question of LGBTQ rights looks different with Din in the mix.
On a first reading, Din seems to strengthen Obergefells mar-
riage exceptionalism. Justice Kennedy and Justice Alito's
somewhat grudging acknowledgment of the marital rights of
immigrants is an acknowledgment of marital rights, not cohab-
itation rights. But once Justice Breyer's dissent is taken into
account, as well as Chief Justice Robert's short statement on
equal protection in his Obergefell dissent, the future looks less
bleak for LGBTQ plaintiffs. Breyer and perhaps the other three
liberal Justices seem open to equal access claims that extend
far beyond marriage, and even Chief Justice Roberts is open to
equal protection claims brought by members of non-suspect
classes. Granted, many of the claims that plaintiffs would be
most eager to make will not be constitutional ones. Most em-
ployment discrimination and housing discrimination occurs
through private, not state, action, making the Equal Protection
clause inapplicable. But Title VII jurisprudence draws from
Equal Protection jurisprudence, and a different Obergefell-
one that held that bans on same-sex marriage were unconsti-
tutional because they discriminated based on sex-would have
had far-reaching implications for statutory anti-discrimination
law.2 7 8 Justice Breyer's gesture toward an equal access ap-
proach-even in a procedural due process, rather than equal
protection, context-gives credence to the notion that the
Court might apply its broad Obergefell holding, that discrimi-
nation against LGBTQ people is irrational and robs them of
their dignity, to a variety of other contexts. Indeed, at least one
277 Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of
Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REv. 817, 824 (2014) (footnote omitted).
278 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 10, at 1144-45 (arguing that "the ques-
tion of whether a public or private actor has intentionally discriminated against
an individual because of sex remains the same" whether under the Constitution
or under Title VII, Title IX, the Fair Housing Act, the Equal Pay Act, or the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act).
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Court has already cited Obergefell to support a Title VII claim.
In EEOC v. Scott Medical Health Center, a district judge denied
the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Title VII, holding that Title VII's "because of sex" provi-
sion "prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion."2 7 9 The district judge went on to observe that:
[Obergefell] demonstrates a growing recognition of the illegal-
ity of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. That
someone can be subjected to a barrage of insults, humilia-
tion, hostility and/or changes to the terms and conditions of
their employment, based upon nothing more than the aggres-
sor's view of what it means to be a man or a woman, is exactly
the evil Title VII was designed to eradicate. 2 8 0
Were a case such as this one to be appealed to the current U.S.
Supreme Court, Breyer's Din dissent suggests that at least four
of the Justices would have a more expansive view of LGBTQ
rights than the married-focused ones articulated by the
Obergefell majority.
B. Family Reunification Rights
Perhaps the most salient implication of Obergefell and Din
at the present is that U.S. citizens may have a cognizable con-
stitutional claim for family reunification with their immigrant
spouses and children. Prior to Din, this claim seemed out of
reach. Knauff Mezei, and the more recent Fiallo v. Bell,2 8 1
appeared to foreclose arguments that family interests could
ever outweigh federal immigration authority. Din, at the very
least, created doubt. By holding that "even assuming she has
such an interest [in family reunification], the Government sat-
isfied due process when it notified Din's husband that his visa
was denied under the immigration statute's terrorism bar,"2 8 2
Justices Kennedy and Alito create the possibility that, under
other circumstances, this interest could triumph. Context is
critical to the Din concurrence's logic; absent the counter-ter-
rorism context, family reunification interest might outweigh
the state's interest in exclusion.
It is important not to overstate this possibility. Both Con-
gress and the Executive typically receive far greater deference
279 217 F. Supp. 3d 834, 839 (W.D. Pa. 2016).
280 Id. at 842 (citation omitted).
281 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). Schaughnessy v. United States ex
reL Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); United States ex reL Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338
U.S. 537 (1950).
282 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2139 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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when acting under their immigration powers than in other con-
texts. 283 But in recent litigation over President Trump's "travel
ban" executive order, 28 4 Din has begun to play a role, and
might play a larger one in subsequent litigation.
The initial Executive Order, among other things, sus-
pended immigration from seven majority-Muslim nations for
ninety days.2 8 5 It was quickly challenged in court in several
states. Unlike Din, the Order did not respond to a particular
threat by a particular person. Instead, it linked the ban to the
September 11, 2001 attacks of over sixteen years before and
vague statements that terrorism had not been stopped.28 6
Because so many individuals affected by the ban were al-
ready in transit, family reunification did not come to the fore:
the procedural due process claims for pre-vetted visa-holders
were far stronger and more-clear cut than nascent family
reunification claims.28 7 In addition, the President had so
prominently advertised a pending "Muslim ban" during his
campaign that the targeting of the seven countries in question
made it easy for courts to find that litigants were likely to
succeed on the merits of their First Amendment Establishment
Clause claims. 288 Nonetheless, litigants did make these claims
283 See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens,
Territories, and the Nineteenth-Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Af-
fairs, 81 Tx. L. REV. 1, 158-63 (2002) (tracing history of immigration power).
284 Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,
82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
285 Id. ("I hereby proclaim that the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the
United States of aliens from countries referred to in section 217(a)(12) of the INA,
8 U.S.C. 1187(a)(12), would be detrimental to the interests of the United States,
and I hereby suspend entry into the United States, as immigrants and nonimmi-
grants, of such persons for 90 days from the date of this order (excluding those
foreign nationals traveling on diplomatic visas, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
visas, C-2 visas for travel to the United Nations, and G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4
visas).").
286 See id. § 1.
287 See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d. 1151, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2017) (find-
ing that because Executive Order stated on its face that it applied to lawful
permanent residents, that the Government did not meet its burden for lifting the
stay on appeal with regard to the due process claims).
288 See, e.g., Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724, 736 (E.D. Va. 2017) (finding
that "Ithe 'Muslim ban' was a centerpiece of the president's campaign for months,
and the press release calling for it was still available on his website as of the day
this Memorandum Opinion is being entered. . . . The president connected that
policy to this EO when, asked last July if he had abandoned his plan for a Muslim
ban, he responded 'Call it whatever you want. We'll call it territories, OK?' . . .
Giuliani said two days after the EO was signed that Trump's desire for a Muslim
ban was the impetus for this policy .... And on the same day that the president
signed the EO, he lamented that under the old policy, 'If you were a Muslim you
could come in, but if you were a Christian, it was almost impossible,' and said his
administration was 'going to help' make persecuted Christians a priority." (cita-
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in a number of cases, 28 9 and, as the Trump Administration
refines its approach and begins to better target areas of the law
that are less settled, Din is likely to play a pivotal role. The
Ninth Circuit recently hinted at this possibility in Washington
v. Trump. There, the Government argued that the Executive
Order did not violate procedural due process because the Gov-
ernment was not enforcing it against lawful permanent re-
sidents ("green card" holders) and only they had such rights.290
The Ninth Circuit panel disagreed. Noncitizens beyond green
card holders might also have such rights, the court explained,
including "applicants who have a relationship with a U.S. resi-
dent or an institution that might have rights of its own to
assert." 29 1
Obergefell provided the Justices of the Supreme Court an
opportunity to think deeply about the meaning of marriage and
whether they believed it to be constitutionally protected or not.
They were then able to simultaneously apply these under-
standings to a different context. The robust marriage rights
outlined in Obergefell found their way into Din, albeit in very
different forms. Together, these two cases could provide the
ammunition to overrule affirmatively Knauff and Mezet
CONCLUSION
Today we stand on the edge of what could be a very differ-
ent constitutional era. Justice Scalia has passed away; many
of the Justices are of an age where death or retirement is likely
imminent; a new Justice, Neil Gorsuch, has taken Justice
Scalia's seat; and our new President may well make further
nominations. It could be that the composition of the Court will
change so much in the next five years that the constitutional
family theories explored here will become less important.
The positions staked out by the Justices on the current
Court, however, are largely representative of the positions that
have been advocated by litigants, scholars, and amict in a vari-
tions omitted)); see also Trump, 847 F.3d. at 1168 (finding that the state's Estab-
lishment Clause claims "raise serious allegations and present significant
constitutional questions").
289 See, e.g., Osman Nasreldin & Sahar Kamal Ahmed Fadul's Motion to Inter-
vene at 1-2, Aziz, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 724 (No. 1: 17-cv-00 116), ECF No. 26 (motion
to intervene in litigation to enjoin Executive Order brought by U.S. citizen and his
fianc6e, who was stopped by CPB agents at Dulles airport and was allegedly told,
fraudulently, that her visa had been "cancelled" and was sent back to Ethiopia).
290 Thump, 847 F.3d at 1164-65.
291 Id& at 1166 (citing Kennedy's concurrence and Breyer's dissent in Kerry v.
Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015)).
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ety of constitutional family cases over the last fifteen to twenty
years. Regardless of which view can marshal a majority in any
given case, these theories are likely to be the ones that domi-
nate. One important implication of this Article is that it may be
an individual Justice's theory of the relationship between the
constitution and the family that is most important in how he or
she will decide a particular case, rather than the specific test
applied. In other words, whether a Justice understands mar-
riage as an exercise of citizenship, as a natural right, or as an
expectancy interest tells us more about how that Justice will
behave in future cases than whether he or she would apply the
traditional tiers of scrutiny or that equal protection or substan-
tive due process is the more appropriate doctrine. Now that
family law has become constitutionalized, the Justices' per-
sonal theories of the meaning of marriage and family will be
critical in the development of constitutional family doctrine.
Now that the Court has determined that there is a right to
marry, the next wave of cases will likely involve the rights of
marriage.
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